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Beyond the Judicial Fourth
Amendment: The Prosecutor's Role
Russell M. Gold*
Scholarly discussion of the Fourth Amendment focuses narrowly on
judicial enforcement and the exclusionary rule. This Article takes a
different approach: recognizing that prosecutors have a co-equal
responsibility to enforce the Fourth Amendment. More specifically,
prosecutors have a constitutional and ethical duty not to use evidence that
they conclude was unconstitutionally obtained even if that evidence is
admissible-the duty of administrative suppression. Instead of analyzing
whether evidence would likely be deemed admissible by a court,
prosecutors should instead analyze whether the evidence in their cases
was gathered unconstitutionally and act accordingly.
Scholars have ignored that as the Supreme Court has constricted the
scope of the exclusionary rule over the past 40 years it has narrowed only
the scope of the judicial remedy and not the Fourth Amendment right.
Drawing on the theory of constitutional underenforcement most
prominently developed by Larry Sager, this Article argues that when the
Court constricted the judicial remedy it left prosecutors and the rest of the
executive branch solely responsible for enforcing the full breadth of the
constitutional norm. The full breadth of the Fourth Amendment norm
continues to prohibit the executive branch from using unconstitutionally-
obtained evidence even though judicial suppression is not always
appropriate. The prosecutor's duty of administrative suppression also
prevents Fourth Amendment rights from being marginalized in an
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administrative system of criminal justice in which most cases end in guilty
pleas before suppression motions are filed.
Prosecutors' ethical responsibilities provide an additional basis for
prosecutors' duty of administrative suppression. Refusing to countenance
constitutional violations by the police will protect citizens' constitutional
rights and promote crime control. That administrative suppression would
promote crime control relies on the procedural justice notion that citizens'
perception of their government officials' legitimacy plays the most
significant role in their willingness to comply with the law and cooperate
with law enforcement. For prosecutors to refuse to use the fruits of a
constitutional violation and instead condemn the violation through
administrative suppression will promote government legitimacy.
Ultimately, prosecutors-not just courts and police-are constitutional
actors with Fourth Amendment obligations.
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Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment
INTRODUCTION
Academic scholarship discusses the Fourth Amendment within the
narrow confines of judicial enforcement and the exclusionary rule.'
Scholars have not explored prosecutors' constitutional and ethical
duties to comply with the Fourth Amendment.2 This Article ventures
into that void.
Outside the Fourth Amendment context, scholars have persuasively
argued that some constitutional rights are underenforced by the
judiciary, meaning that the judiciary enforces less than the full breadth
of the constitutional norm because of the judiciary's institutional role
or capacity.' When a right is institutionally underenforced, the
political branches must enforce the full breadth of the constitutional
norm and not merely its judicially-enforced shadow.'
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court severed questions of
Fourth Amendment constitutionality from judicial admissibility. Most
prominently, the Court held that unconstitutionally-obtained evidence
need not be suppressed when it is obtained by police relying in good
faith on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that is
not so facially deficient as to preclude a reasonable officer from relying
See, e.g., TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 337-44 (2013); Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A More
Majestic Conception": The Importance ofJudicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary
Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 59 (2010); Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule
Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2012); Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader,
No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 Miss. L.J. 1183, 1189-90 (2012). But see Jason A.
Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth
Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 193-98 (2013) (addressing Fourth
Amendment responsibilities of Immigration and Customs Enforcement prosecutors).
"Exclusionary rule" in this Article refers only to the Fourth Amendment judicial
exclusionary rule.
2 One article discusses an "executive exclusionary rule," Marc L. Miller & Ronald
F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 138 (2008) [hereinafter Black Box], but
its analysis is descriptive rather than normative and focuses on admissibility rather
than constitutionality. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.1(b)
n.34.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (describing Miller & Wright's "executive exclusionary
rule" with reference to likelihood of judicial suppression).
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1220-21 (1978).
4 See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 91-92, 116 (2004).
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on it.' Since then, the Court has expanded the good-faith exception
outside the warrant context to all merely negligent violations.6
It has gone unnoticed that when the Supreme Court severed
constitutionality from admissibility by holding that judicial
suppression was not a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment
violation,' it left the Fourth Amendment right institutionally
underenforced. In so doing, the Court repositioned itself
institutionally as a deferential, secondary check on Fourth
Amendment enforcement and refused to afford a remedy for some
executive branch violations. But because the Court severed
constitutionality from admissibility (right from remedy), its
admissibility holdings no longer addressed the broader question of
constitutionality. Therefore, as the Court has continued to pare back
the exclusionary rule,' it has not altered the scope of the Fourth
Amendment but only the scope of its judicial enforcement.'
For that reason, the Fourth Amendment norm remains largely as the
Court interpreted it in the first half of the twentieth century. The bar
against government use of illegally-obtained evidence waslo-and
remains-a core component of the Fourth Amendment right necessary
to prevent the Fourth Amendment from becoming "'a form of words,'
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties."" Although courts do not exclude all
unconstitutionally-obtained evidence, prosecutors as executive officers
should refrain from introducing evidence that they conclude was
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
6 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (holding that
courts need not suppress evidence from use before a grand jury even though it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
I See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out?
Should It Be?, 10 OHIo ST.J. CRIM. L. 341, 341 (2013) [hereinafter Is It on Its Way Out?]
(explaining that the Court has "nibbled away at the exclusionary rule").
9 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2469-70, 2504-32 (1996)
(arguing that although the Court has largely accepted the Warren Court's substantive
criminal procedural holdings, it has altered the consequences of unconstitutional
conduct by creating "inclusionary rules"); infra Part II.
10 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914) (holding that
Fourth Amendment limits courts in their exercise of authority and that Fourth
Amendment "might as well be stricken from the Constitution" if it allowed the
government to introduce into evidence the fruits of an unconstitutional search).
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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unconstitutionally obtained without regard to judicial admissibility-a
duty of administrative suppression."
Moreover, this Article contends that prosecutors' existing ethical
responsibilities provide good reason to administratively suppress
evidence." Unlike with ordinary rules of evidence, introducing search
and seizure evidence generates blowback from prosecutors' actions in
the courtroom to police actions on the street. Because much of the
evidence that police obtain in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
admissible due to exceptions to the exclusionary rule, prosecutors
who use admissibility as their benchmark signal to police that
constitutional violations are typically costless. That signal contravenes
prosecutors' responsibility to encourage police to comply with the law
and undermines the constitutional rights of prosecutors'
constituents." Administrative suppression, in contrast, would send the
opposite signal: Fourth Amendment violations have consequences.
Signaling to the public that the government takes seriously police
violations of their rights promotes crime control based on Steve
Schulhofer, Tom Tyler, and Aziz Huq's procedural justice model of
policing." The procedural justice model of policing relies on empirical
evidence demonstrating that citizens comply with the law and
cooperate with police primarily because of desire to obey legitimate
authority rather than fear of consequences.1 Citizens' perception of
legitimacy is based primarily on whether they believe that they are
treated fairly and with respect." When prosecutors sanction
constitutional violations and signal to the public that Fourth
Amendment violations will neither be tolerated nor exploited in court,
12 See infra Part II.
1 See infra Part III.
14 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.3(b) (2008).
15 See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American
Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative,
101J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2011).
16 See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (2006) (concluding based on
empirical study "that legitimacy plays an important role in promoting compliance"
with the law); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 513, 529 (2003)
(finding that perceptions of police legitimacy had stronger correlation to citizen
cooperation with police than did citizens' evaluation of risk).
" See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 16, at 162 (explaining that views about legitimacy of
authority "are strongly connected to judgments of the fairness of the procedures
through which authorities make decisions"); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 16, at 526
(reporting results of study concluding that procedural justice had a much stronger
impact on police legitimacy than did performance evaluations or distributive justice
judgments and was not based at all on citizens' estimates of risk of punishment).
2014] 1595
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they demonstrate respect for the rights of the citizenry and
commitment to the rule of law. That action promotes the perception of
fairness in criminal law enforcement. Indeed, a sanction from
prosecutors would promote the perception of fairness better than the
judicial exclusionary rule. For these reasons, administrative
suppression is likely to promote the perceived legitimacy of criminal
law enforcement, which will in turn advance crime control efforts.
Moreover, to prevent the consequence of lost evidence, police would
be incentivized to consult prosecutors for their Fourth Amendment
expertise, which would allow prosecutors to serve their intended role
as an intra-executive-branch check." Police would more frequently
ask prosecutors to approve warrant applications-as ethical standards
already recommendl 9-and prosecutors would have reason to make
that review as stringent as possible. For these reasons, administrative
suppression would help eviscerate the Fourth Amendment right-
remedy distinction within the executive branch that has no place
outside the judiciary.
Prosecutors serve as ministers of justice, which requires them to
fight cleanly." Although prosecutors should seek convictions, they
cannot do so at all costs. 2 1 Indeed, prosecutors sometimes win when
they "lose" a case. They must ensure that the rights of criminal
defendants are respected, both inside and outside the courtroom. In
the courtroom, existing ethical standards recognize that prosecutors
should not seek to introduce relevant evidence in pursuit of a
conviction if they lack a "reasonable basis" for its admissibility.23
Introducing tangible evidence only when prosecutors have a
reasonable basis for admissibility respects the rules of evidence and
their duty not to strike foul blows.24
Prosecutors mistakenly treat Fourth Amendment admissibility
similarly. As part of their case-screening process, they analyze
" See United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1 cmt. (1993); infra
text accompanying notes 287-292.
19 See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-2.1 & cmt. (Nat'1 Dist. Att'ys Ass'n
2009). There will of course be exigencies in which police do not have time to seek a
prosecutor's advice.
20 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
21 See id.
22 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4
(1940) ("Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if
justice has been done.").
23 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6.
24 See id. § 3-5.6(d); see also Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
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evidence for admissibility under the judicial exclusionary rule.25 But
the Fourth Amendment is not an ordinary rule of evidence,2 6 and
prosecutors' responsibility therefor must account for the scope of the
constitutional right beyond merely its judicially-enforced component.
Prosecutors must account for the fact that quite unlike other forms of
questionably-admissible evidence, introducing evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment allows police to play fast and
loose with constitutional requirements without consequence, which in
turn undermines crime control efforts. Prosecutors should not screen
and charge cases based on whether evidence is likely admissible but
whether it was obtained constitutionally. For instance, a prosecutor
who concludes that evidence was obtained unconstitutionally but that
it is likely admissible nonetheless because of the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule should refrain from using that evidence. 7
Administrative suppression can be viewed as incorporating Fourth
Amendment analysis into a form of "hard screening within our
"administrative system of criminal justice."2 As now-judge Gerard
Lynch explained, our criminal justice system is largely administrative
because prosecutors make the important decisions subject to limited
judicial review.3 0 But some important decisions, including decisions
regarding constitutionality of searches and seizures, remain largely
25 See Miller & Wright, Black Box, supra note 2, at 135 & n.20, 138 (explaining
that prosecutors declined some cases for "evidentiary flaws" including "unlawful
search no warrant" or "no probable cause for arrest" and tying these bases to
anticipation of judicial suppression).
26 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
27 There is reason to think that immigration prosecutors in North Carolina and
perhaps criminal prosecutors in Manhattan have considered constitutionality rather
than admissibility. See infra notes 297-299 and accompanying text.
28 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 32-33 (2002) [hereinafter Screening/Bargaining Tradeoffl. Wright and
Miller do not embrace administrative suppression as part of the prosecutor's screening
decision, but their call for greater emphasis on the screening decision nonetheless
squares well with this proposal.
29 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117 (1998).
3 Id. at 2117, 2121, 2129; accord Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and
Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1409, 1409 (2003) (embracing Lynch's
description); see also, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor
Bias and the Department ofJustice, 99 VA. L. REv. 271, 273-74 (2013); Miller & Wright,
Black Box, supra note 2, at 137 (arguing that "quality control functions" such as
assessing evidence now occur within prosecutor's office); H. Richard Uviller, The
Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1695, 1714-15 (2000) [hereinafter Neutral Prosecutor] (arguing that prosecutors
have gradually displaced courts as "arbiter[s] of a just resolution").
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exogenous to the current administrative model, which undermines
their practical import." Incorporating Fourth Amendment analysis
into the administrative model of criminal justice prevents Fourth
Amendment rights from being marginalized even though most cases
end in guilty pleas, many of which precede judicial review of a search
or seizure.
Ultimately, this Article contends that prosecutors have a
constitutional and ethical responsibility to independently analyze
whether each piece of evidence in their cases was constitutionally
obtained and refrain from using evidence that they conclude was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment regardless of judicial
admissibility.33
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the concept of
constitutional underenforcement and its implications for the
constitutional duties of the executive branch vis-a-vis the judiciary.
Part 11 examines the doctrinal development of the judicial
exclusionary rule. Part II.A analyzes this exclusionary rule case law to
conclude that the right-remedy divide limits only Fourth Amendment
judicial enforcement. Part II.B relies on that case law to conclude that
the full breadth of the Fourth Amendment norm imposes on
prosecutors a constitutional duty of administrative suppression. Part
III then analyzes why prosecutors' ethical responsibilities also provide
a basis for a duty of administrative suppression.
I. UNDERENFORCED CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
Scholarly work on underenforced constitutional norms most
prominently developed by Larry Sager provides a helpful lens to see
why the Fourth Amendment requires prosecutors to refrain from
using unconstitutionally-obtained evidence even when it does not
obligate the judiciary to suppress that evidence. Sager distinguishes
between "analytical" and "institutional" judicial limitations on a
constitutional norm.3 ' Analytical limitations are those based on an
understanding of the underlying constitutional concept.35 Institutional
31 Other criminal procedure rights are also exogenous to the administrative
model. Perhaps they too should be incorporated into the prosecutor's analysis in
embrace of the administrative model, but that query is beyond the scope of this
Article.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 215-227.
1 Exhaustively analyzing enforceability of this duty is beyond the scope of this
Article.
3 Sager, supra note 3, at 1217-18.
35 Id.
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limitations, however, are those "based upon questions of propriety or
capacity" of the judiciary. 6 Because institutional judicial limitations
do not limit the scope of the constitutional norm itself, they result in
underenforcement.
Sager points to equal protection and due process challenges to
economic regulations as examples of institutional underenforcement."
The Court reviews such claims under the highly-deferential rational
basis standard." But it does not do so, Sager contends, because the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit economic
regulations only when they are irrational. 39 Rather, the Court defers to
prevent unelected judges from displacing elected officials' judgments
or because legislators are more competent than judges to assess the
means necessary to achieve particular ends. 0
There are many other familiar contexts in which courts refuse to
afford a remedy for constitutional violations by a state or co-equal
branch of the federal government because of the Court's desire to
preserve its institutional role. Sovereign immunity often prevents
courts from redressing constitutional violations in civil suits against
governments." Suits against executive officers are dismissed because
of qualified immunity even when courts find that the plaintiffs rights
were violated unless the right was clearly established. Qualified
immunity is a judicial creation meant to provide breathing room for
executive officials to do their jobs without intense scrutiny from
courts.4 Similarly, the political question doctrine prompts courts to
turn a blind eye to possible constitutional violations by the political
36 Id.
3 Id. at 1215-16 (equal protection); id. at 1220 & n.24 (due process).
38 SAGER, supra note 4, at 115-16; Sager, supra note 3, at 1215-16, 1220 & n.24.
3 Sager, supra note 3, at 1216-17.
40 Id.
41 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that it is inherent in a
constitutional scheme that sovereigns are not amenable to judicial suit); see also Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("[T]he States' immunity from suit is a
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification
of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of
the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.").
4 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Between 2001 and 2009,
courts were required by the "order of battle" rule to decide whether a plaintiffs
constitutional rights had been violated before deciding whether the law on point was
clearly established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), overruled by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Under that now-optional framework,
courts frequently held that rights were violated but no remedy should follow.
1 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
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branches or the states to protect separation of powers or federalism."
Lastly, although prosecutors who make charging and plea bargaining
decisions arbitrarily or capriciously violate due process, due process
challenges alleging selective prosecution contest matters so squarely
within the purview of the executive branch that they are
nonjusticiable unless based on membership in a suspect or quasi-
suspect class.
Recognizing institutional underenforcement is critical because
institutional underenforcement means that the reach of executive
responsibility and judicial enforcement of the same constitutional
provision are not coextensive. Rather, the limits on judicial
enforceability of the constitutional norm do not apply to the political
branches."4 The executive and legislative branches remain charged
with enforcing the full breadth of an underenforced constitutional
norm and not solely its judicially-enforceable component.4 As David
Strauss explains:
" See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (explaining that Republican
Guaranty Clause provides constitutional right even though it is non-justiciable);
SAGER, supra note 4, at 90-91 (describing political question doctrine as jurisprudential
recognition of institutional underenforcement); Sager, supra note 3, at 1224-25
(same).
" See United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1298-301 (9th Cir. 1992),
overruled en banc on other grounds by United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (noting
that the "decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review" and
justiciable only when alleging selective prosecution "'deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification"' (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))).
46 SAGER, supra note 4, at 88, 93-94; Sager, supra note 3, at 1212-13; see Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189,
1224 (2006) ("[T]he fact that the courts have essentially no role in implementing
certain provisions of the Constitution does not license the executive branch to ignore
those provisions. Instead, executive officials have a duty to abide by their own best
understanding of the provisions.").
41 See SAGER, supra note 4, at 116 (where Court's decisions not intended to
exhaust full meaning of constitutional norm, it is non-sequitur to limit political
branches to "deference-drenched" doctrine); Morrison, supra note 46, at 1225
("[Wihen institutional or other factors inhibit robust judicial enforcement of a
particular constitutional provision, it falls to the executive (and legislative) branch to
enforce the provision more fully."). One commentator explained that a footnote in
Heller v. District of Columbia suggests a marked departure from the idea that
underenforcement exists. H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The
Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REv. 217, 259-60
(2011). But Powell seems right to question whether all five members of the Heller
majority genuinely accepted the full ramifications of what would constitute a
jurisprudential sea change via tangential footnote. Id. at 260.
[Vol. 47:15911600
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Sometimes the executive branch should interpret the
Constitution to impose stricter limits on its power than the
Supreme Court's decisions themselves suggest. That is because
in certain categories of cases, constitutional law as developed
by the Supreme Court reflects great deference to judgments
made by the executive branch. This is an aspect of the problem
of underenforced constitutional norms."8
If the executive branch were to incorporate the Court's deference into
its own obligations, that would constitute "circular buck-passing." 49
Underenforcement therefore helps explain why the executive branch's
Fourth Amendment duties exceed the scope of judicial suppression.
11. RIGHT-REMEDY DIVIDE AND EXECUTIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT
DUTIES
The previous section explained the concept of underenforced
constitutional norms and its implications for the relative scope of
executive and judicial constitutional duties. This section proceeds in
two parts. Part A analyzes the nature of Fourth Amendment
underenforcemento: the Court has expressly divided rights and
remedies such that the judiciary does not provide a remedy in some
instances even when it concludes that the executive branch violated
the Fourth Amendment.51 Part B then explains why the full breadth of
* David S. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOzo L.
REV. 113, 128-29 (1993).
4 Id. at 129.
5o Although Sager noted in 1978 that Fourth Amendment rights were not
conducive to underenforcement analysis, Sager, supra note 3, at 1244 n.104, doctrinal
changes since then undermine that conclusion. Perhaps tellingly, Sager does not
repeat this claim in his 2004 book addressing underenforcement. See generally SAGER,
supra note 4. While United States v. Calandra had already been decided in 1978,
Calandra quite reasonably could have been viewed then as a narrow case about the
grand jury, see 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974), because the Court had not yet limited the
exclusionary rule in criminal trials, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925-26
(1984) (limiting exclusionary rule in criminal trial).
51 Others have recognized a degree of Fourth Amendment underenforcement but
for reasons different than those advanced here. Bill Stuntz explained that because
Fourth Amendment suppression motions are brought by those caught engaged in
criminal activity, judges' biases naturally distort the Fourth Amendment inquiry.
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 883-
84, 912-13 (1991); see also Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary
Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 585, 656-60 (2011) (describing underenforcement of
Fourth Amendment because of exclusionary rule's lack of popularity and its rigidity).
Louis Bilionis identifies Supreme Court Justices' ideology as a source for
underenforcing non-accuracy-promoting criminal procedure rights. Louis D. Bilionis,
2014] 1601
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the Fourth Amendment norm requires administrative suppression.
Both analyses rely on the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule
jurisprudence.
Weeks v. United States5 2 established the exclusionary rule not as a
mere prophylactic or a mere remedy designed to deter police
misconduct but as an integral component of the Fourth Amendment
right." Weeks unanimously held that if unconstitutionally-obtained
evidence could be "seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment ...
is of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken from the
Constitution."4 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States5 then held,
the notion "that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical
possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over
the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act .. . is not the
law ... [and] reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."56
Rather, "the essence" of the Fourth Amendment is that "evidence
On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1803, 1819-21 (1992).
52 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Although there were certainly
precursors to Weeks's adoption of the exclusionary rule, Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (1983); see Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-35 (1886), abrogated by Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585
(1904), this Article begins with Weeks because it provided the first clear holding
establishing the exclusionary rule in a strictly Fourth Amendment criminal context.
5 MACLIN, supra note 1, at xii, 13-17; William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the
Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 371-72 (1981) ("When the rule was conceived, it was not
premised on deterrence at all, but on an amalgam of values, and was viewed as
inextricably bound up with the fourth amendment itself. Thus, the Court originally
saw the suppression of evidence as a necessary consequence of a fourth amendment
violation."); see Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392-93; see also SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS:
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES FROM KING JOHN TO JOHN ASHCROFT 63 (2004);
Bloom & Fentin, supra note 1, at 50; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?,
16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 565 n.1 (1983); Maclin & Rader, supra note 1, at 1184;
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 282, 288 (1974). Because the
exclusionary rule's origins have received detailed coverage in numerous books and
articles, see, for example, MACLIN, supra note 1, this Article will delve into these early
cases only insofar as necessary for this argument.
5 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. Another reason animating exclusion in Weeks was the
idea that it would compromise judicial integrity by involving the judiciary in the
violation. See Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 5
(1964); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 282, 288.
" Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
56 Id. at 391-92 (citation omitted).
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[illegally] acquired ... shall not be used at all."5 7 Neither Weeks nor
Silverthorne Lumber mentions "an exclusionary rule" because "[t]he
legal prohibition on the use of unlawfully-obtained evidence came
from the Fourth Amendment itself," which rendered another term
superfluous.58 From 1914 until the 1970s, exclusion remained a core
component of the Fourth Amendment." Because the Fourteenth
Amendment was not interpreted to incorporate the full breadth of the
Fourth Amendment,"o however, state courts were not required to
exclude unconstitutionally-obtained evidence. 1 In some of its cases
addressing this disparity between the scopes of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court began to suggest that exclusion
was a mere remedy designed to deter violations.2 In the 1960s,
judicial exclusion remained an essential component of the Fourth
Amendment right, and the Court broadened the Fourteenth
Amendment's protections to match the Fourth's.63 Mapp v. Ohio"4
5 Id.; accord Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946) ("As explained in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. . . . , the evidence so obtained is suppressed on the theory
that the government may not profit from its own wrongdoing."), vacated, 330 U.S. 800
(1947).
58 MACLIN, supra note 1, at 22.
59 See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951) (holding that because
property was seized in violation of Fourth Amendment defendant was necessarily
entitled to its suppression); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (rejecting
argument that unconstitutionally-obtained evidence was properly used in rebuttal and
explaining that "It]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so aquired [sic] shall not be used before the
court but that it shall not be used at all" (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at
391-92)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing admission of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence in criminal
trial as "a result that had previously been thought to be foreclosed"); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 210 (1960) (describing "unquestioning adherence" to Weeks rule).
60 See MACLIN, supra note 1, at 43-65 (explaining that although Wolf v. Colorado
spoke of incorporating the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment protections
applied through the Fourteenth in state courts were not as broad as the Fourth
Amendment applied directly in federal courts).
61 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-31 (1949) (declining to incorporate the
exclusionary rule against the states while "stoutly adherling]" to the federal
exclusionary rule), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
62 MACLIN, supra note 1, at xii; see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (excluding from
federal criminal trials evidence obtained by state law enforcement officials based on
supervisory power of federal courts and noting that deterrence is purpose of
exclusionary rule).
3 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) ("[T]he Weeks rule is of
constitutional origin."); see also, e.g., Stewart, supra note 52, at 1389 ("Thus, although
I did not join in the Court's opinion in the Mapp case-because it decided an issue
that was not before the Court-I agree with its conclusion that the exclusionary rule is
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incorporated the exclusionary rule against the states because to do
otherwise would render the Fourth Amendment "'a form of words,'
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties.""5
Since Mapp, the Court has departed from this more "majestic"
conception of the exclusionary rule in which judicial exclusion is a
component of the Fourth Amendment right.66 The Court's first explicit
rejection of the majestic conception came in United States v.
Calandra,67 where the Court held that evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment need not be judicially suppressed from the
grand jury." More broadly, however, Calandra explained that not
every Fourth Amendment violation requires courts to exclude
resulting evidence. 9 In so doing, the Court divorced the Fourth
Amendment remedy from the right.
necessary to keep the right of privacy secured by the fourth amendment from
'remaining an empty promise."' (footnotes omitted)); Stuntz, supra note 51, at 883-84,
910-11 (exclusionary rule is restitutionary, forcing officers to give up gains from their
misconduct). The justification for the exclusionary rule in Mapp is admittedly more
opaque than in Weeks or Silverthorne Lumber. But see Kamisar, supra note 53, at 623
("{T] he message-in light of the totality of Clark's opinion [in Mapp]-is fairly clear:
We reaffirm the 'original understanding' of the exclusionary rule, as explained in
Weeks and its progeny, that (anything to the contrary in Wolf notwithstanding) it is a
constitutionally-required rule, although not explicitly provided for in the text of the
fourth amendment-and moreover (again, anything to the contrary in Wolf
notwithstanding), it is the most effective (or the only presently available effective)
means of deterring police conduct." (footnotes omitted)).
64 Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
65 Id. at 655.
66 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151-52 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (describing a more "majestic" conception); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
18 (1995) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (same).
61 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974); see Henry P.
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975)
(Calandra "cut the exclusionary rule entirely free from any personal right or necessary
remedy approach").
61 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354-55. This claim leaves aside pre-Mapp case law
regarding incorporation against the states because those cases maintained that
suppression in federal courts was automatic. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
28 (1949) ("stoutly [adhering]" to the Weeks rule "that in a federal prosecution the
Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure"). Tracey Maclin persuasively argues that Linkletter v. Walker was the first
post-Mapp case to consider judicial exclusion separately from the Fourth Amendment
right. MACLIN, supra note 1, at 108. Nonetheless, because Linkletter seems to turn
largely on fears of causing a "jail break," id. at 113-14; see Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 637 (1965), and its discussion of exclusion is terse, this Article begins with
Calandra on this point.
69 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354-55.
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Once the Court severed applicability of the exclusionary rule from
whether police violated the Fourth Amendment,70 it began to
significantly shrink the scope of the exclusionary remedy. United
States v. Leonn held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to use of
evidence at trial obtained by police officers relying on a warrant that
was not facially deficient." The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts further
pared back the judicially-enforced exclusionary rule by expanding the
good-faith exception to include warrantless searches resulting from an
error by a court clerk7 1 or a "merely negligent" error by a police
warrant clerk." Most recently, the Court held that the exclusionary
rule does not apply when police comply with later-overruled judicial
precedent." As Christopher Slobogin puts it, "exceptions have made
70 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (majority opinion) (describing "Fourth
Amendment violation" in contrast to "more stringent test for triggering the
exclusionary rule"); Evans, 514 U.S. at 10 (majority opinion) ("The question whether
the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been
regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.");
Bloom & Fentin, supra note 1, at 49 (describing invocation of exclusionary rule as
"failing to apply a remedy to an acknowledged constitutional violation"); Thomas K.
Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10 OHIO
ST.J. CRIM. L. 357, 378 (2013) (describing "severance of the Fourth Amendment right
from the remedy"); J. Donald Hobart, Jr., Illinois v. Krull: Extending the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule's Good Faith Exception to Warrantless Searches Authorized
by Statute, 66 N.C. L. REv. 781, 793 n.92 (1988) ("[Glood faith exception
acknowledges a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights yet wholly denies him a
remedy. . . ."); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 850 (2013) ("While acknowledging the invasion of
constitutional rights occasioned by an unreasonable search, the Court has severed the
suppression remedy from that right, calling the substantive Fourth Amendment
question a 'separate' issue from the remedial one.").
n United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
72 Id. at 922. In Leon, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's refusal to afford a
remedy even when it recognized that Fourth Amendment rights were violated, id. at
977 (Stevens, J., dissenting), which indicates that good faith defines the contours of
the Fourth Amendment judicial remedy rather than the right itself. See Richard M. Re,
The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARv. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript
at 68-71), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2401979
(explaining that the Supreme Court describes the good faith exception as limiting the
Fourth Amendment remedy rather than defining constitutional reasonableness of a
search but advocating the latter approach). Leon is not the first post-Calandra case to
contract the exclusionary remedy, but it made the most significant inroad-at least
until the Roberts Court.
1 Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15.
" Herring, 555 U.S. at 137-39, 144, 147-48.
7 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011). A Fourth Circuit
decision involving a different Mr. Davis reads Herring and Davis's curtailment of the
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the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule a mockery of the original
version established in the early twentieth century." 76
A. Underenforcement Through Right-Remedy Divide
Importantly, although Calandra departed from the more majestic
judicial exclusionary rule embodied in Mapp, Weeks, and other early
exclusionary rule cases, this departure contracted only judicial
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment-the exclusionary rule-and
not the Fourth Amendment itself." Calandra emphasized that the rule
exclusionary rule quite broadly. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 253 (4th
Cir. 2012) (holding that exclusion is inappropriate if officer's actions were merely
negligent on specific facts of the case). Describing this jurisprudential trend narrowing
exclusion, two commentators recently wrote that "the degree of hostility in recent
Supreme Court decisions toward this longstanding rule has been quite breathtaking."
Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1609,
1611 (2012).
7 Slobogin, Is It on Its Way Out?, supra note 8, at 348. Slobogin's assessment of the
current state of the exclusionary rule rightly accounts for states that have
implemented broader exclusion under their state constitutions than the Supreme
Court requires under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id.; see, e.g.,
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 821 (Del. 2000) (rejecting good faith exception); State
v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992) (same); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277,
284-85, 292-93 (Iowa 2000) (same).
n In a recent article, Jason Cade argues that the Fourth Amendment is
underenforced in immigration proceedings because the exclusionary rule does not
apply at all. Cade, supra note 1, at 193-98.
Daryl Levinson has criticized the "rights essentialism" approach to constitutional
law that divides the spheres of rights and remedies where the former is concerned
with "pure" constitutional value and the latter with pragmatic concerns. Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 CoLUM. L. REV. 857
(1999). He rightly identifies underenforcement as a version of rights essentialism. Id.
at 868-70. In the criminal procedure context, Levinson argues that dividing right and
remedy undermines the practical force of rights because police are less likely to
respect them. Id. at 909-11. His conclusion about disrespecting rights without
remedies squares with the ethics claim of this Article: prosecutors cannot ethically
signal to law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment remedy is a mere
inconvenience that prosecutors can frequently evade because doing so would
undermine the right. See infra Part Ill.B. As to Fourth Amendment underenforcement
more broadly, however, this Article maintains that there must be a meaningful
distinction between right and remedy. Aside from the Court's express statements on
this point, for example, Herring, 555 U.S. at 140; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 350-51 (1974), inquiring whether an officer has reasonably relied in good faith
on a warrant or whether an officer's error was merely negligent makes little sense
unless the Fourth Amendment right is broader than its remedy, see Herring, 555 U.S.
at 144-46; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). It would be rather strange
to say that a warrant lacking probable cause or particularity does not violate the
Fourth Amendment simply because courts refuse to provide a remedy. See U.S. CONST.
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was "a judicially created remedy" meant not to redress injuries but to
deter future unlawful conduct"8 and that the Court faced "a question,
not of rights, but of remedies."79 Moreover, the Court explained that
"[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served."" Mr. Calandra's rights were undoubtedly
violated;" the Court simply had to decide the pragmatic question of
whether the judiciary should provide a remedy.8 2 Suppression,
according to Calandra, was merely a mechanism for the judiciary to
remove the incentive for executive disregard of the Fourth
Amendment. 83
After Calandra concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply
despite recognizing that Mr. Calandra's rights were violated, the Court
purported to speak to constitutionality-the full breadth of the
constitutional norm. It framed the issue as whether a prosecutor's
grand jury questioning based on illegally-obtained evidence violated
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." But the actual question
before the Court was whether the district court should prevent the
prosecutor from presenting to a grand jury evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizure. Calandra's language is sloppy. It
ostensibly rejects the argument that each question a prosecutor asks
before a grand jury based on illegally-obtained evidence constitutes a
separate Fourth Amendment violation." But there are three reasons
not to read this language as actually speaking to the executive's Fourth
Amendment duties. First, this reading conflicts with the Court's
amend IV (" [N] o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, . . . and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
7" Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
' Id. at 354; see also id. at 347, 350-51.
80 Id. at 348.
8I Both lower courts found that Calandra's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated, and the government did not challenge that finding in the Supreme Court. Id.
at 342 n.2.
82 Id. at 349-52 (weighing costs and benefits of affording a remedy).
83 Id. at 347, 350-51. Calandra itself addresses only a federal grand jury's use of
evidence gathered by federal agents, but there is no reason to think that federalism
would operate differently than separation of powers in this regard. Cf. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 902 (1984) (employing reasoning similar to Calandra for search
by local police officers).
8 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 353-54.
85 Id. at 339.
86 Id. at 353-54 (stating that grand jury questions "work no new Fourth
Amendment wrong" because they involve no additional intrusion into the defendant's
person, house, papers, or effects).
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explicit statement that it was addressing a question of remedies, not
rights." Second, whether the district court should have compelled the
witness to answer was the only judicially-redressable question, which
would render any statement about the executive's duties or indeed the
defendant's rights the purest dictum.88 And relying on this dictum
would be problematic because it would contradict never-overruled
holdings that improperly-obtained evidence should not be used at
all." Third, for the Court to address the scope of the executive's duties
beyond the scope of judicial enforcement, particularly with respect to
criminal prosecution, violates the separation of powers." Therefore,
the Court's statements about grand jury questioning in Calandra seem
best read as concluding that the district court did not err in refusing to
preclude questioning about illegally-obtained evidence. That the
federal government directs its prosecutors to refrain from introducing
illegally-obtained evidence before the grand jury further supports this
reading."
To the extent that it is unclear whether Calandra holds that judicial
exclusion-rather than a bar on all government use of evidence-is
not a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation, United
States v. Janis92 helps resolve the ambiguity. Janis cites Calandra
repeatedly when discussing whether "a [judicially-created] deterrent
sanction" would be appropriately applied,93 and it explains that
extending the exclusionary rule "would be an unjustifiably drastic
action by the courts in the pursuit of what is an undesired and
undesirable supervisory role over police officers." 94 In support of this
separation of powers point, Janis cites Rizzo v. Goode,95 which held
8 Id. at 350-51, 354.
88 Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (requiring judicial
redressability for Article Ill standing).
89 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920); see also
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
90 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court
Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292-96 (2000);
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983, 985-86, 988
(1987); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221-22, 231 (1994) [hereinafter The Most
Dangerous Branch].
9' See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.231 (1997)
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa
foiareading.room/usam/title9/1 1mcrm.htm.
92 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
9 Id. at 446-48.
9 Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
* Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
1608 [Vol. 47:1591
Beyond theJudicial Fourth Amendment
that the judiciary impermissibly intruded into a state executive
branch's affairs regarding police misconduct.9 6  Janis further
emphasizes that its decision hinges on the role of the judiciary rather
than the scope of the Fourth Amendment right, explaining that the
Court cannot "continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the
pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive
and Legislative Branches."97 And in fact, Janis cites Calandra for the
proposition that "the law has since been clarified" that courts should
"focus on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.""
Like Calandra and Janis, Leon too contracts only the judicial role in
Fourth Amendment enforcement. Leon explains that judicial
suppression "operates as a judicially created remedy."" Although Leon
says that "the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works
no new Fourth Amendment wrong,"' Leon, like Calandra, must have
addressed the only judicially-redressable question: whether the
judicial exclusionary remedy applied."' Thus, Leon should be read for
the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not require courts to
suppress unconstitutionally-obtained evidence when police obtained it
relying on a warrant in good faith.102
96 Id. at 378-80.
" Janis, 428 U.S. at 459.
98 Id. at 457.
9 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'oo Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354).
"0 See id. at 905-06. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott also suggests
that the use of evidence does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 524 U.S. 357, 362
(1998). But as with Leon and Calandra, the Court's opinion should be read as
addressing the only judicially-redressable question: whether a court should force a
state agency to suppress illegally-obtained evidence in parole revocation hearings. See
id. at 367-69 (explaining federalism concerns with federal court intruding into states'
correctional schemes or parole systems).
102 Although then-Assistant Attorney General Stephen Trott did not directly
address administrative suppression when discussing the Leon decision, he embraced
the notion that Leon narrowed judicial suppression but did not alter the executive's
Fourth Amendment duties:
This landmark Supreme Court ruling should be heralded by those of us in
law enforcement not just as a victory for truth in the courtroom or "for our
side" but more importantly as a solemn occasion to reaffirm our faithful
dedication to all constitutional principles as well as the historic right of the
American people to be free from totalitarian searches . . . . As officials
charged with upholding all the laws of the land, the Constitution is our
sacred trust. I am confident that we shall avail ourselves of this opportunity
to demonstrate without ambiguity to the Supreme Court and to the
American people that we are fully capable of discharging this duty.
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Herring v. United States03 is more straightforward. There the Court
openly declined to address the scope of the Fourth Amendment right
but assumed that it was violated, and the Court spoke in expressly
remedial terms." Herring therefore must have addressed only the
bounds of the judicial exclusionary remedy.
Although distinguishing the constitutionality of prosecutors' actions
from the appropriate judicial role in policing these prosecutors' actions
might seem finely parsed, it cuts to the core of constitutional
underenforcement: some unconstitutional executive branch conduct
should not be prevented by the judiciary because the executive branch
must enforce the full breadth of the constitutional norm even though
the judiciary has institutional limitations on its enforcement role.' In
Irvine v. California,o' Justice Jackson and Chief Justice Warren-both
former prosecutors, Jackson a former U.S. Attorney General-
envisioned a different form of Fourth Amendment executive
enforcement beyond the judicial remedy. Although they joined the
judgment affirming the defendant's conviction, Jackson and Warren
called for the U.S. Attorney General to examine the record and
opinion in the case and consider prosecuting the offending officers. 07
The nature of the Fourth Amendment as primarily a regulation of
executive conduct and the "fragmentary" conception of the federal
government generate underenforcement. Calandra adopted this
"fragmentary" conception-as Thomas Schrock and Robert Welsh
label it-in which courts treat the judicial and executive branches of
the federal government as separate entities for Fourth Amendment
purposes.'0o Under the fragmentary conception, "[a] criminal court is
morally separate from and indifferent to the conduct of the rest of the
government." 09 Courts' role is solely to provide a fair trial; they are
Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney Gen., The Challenge to Law Enforcement of the
Reasonable Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, Address Before the Career
Prosecutor Course of the National College of District Attorneys (July 5, 1984) (quoted
in Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 561-62 (1999)).
103 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
'0 Id. at 139, 148-49; see also Brief for United States at 10 n.3, Herring, 555 U.S.
135 (No. 07-513), 2008 WL 2847070, at *10 n.3 (inviting this approach).
105 See SAGER, supra note 4, at 90-99; supra Part 1.
106 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
1o7 Id. at 137-38. Jackson and Warren wrote about the Court's limited pre-
incorporation role in enforcing search and seizure violations against the states through
evidentiary suppression, but that schema resembles the current right-remedy divide.
0 See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 254-55.
109 Id. at 255.
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blameless for allowing fruits of executive misconduct into the
courtroom.110 Calandra applies this fragmentary conception to hold
that allowing the grand jury to consider unconstitutionally-obtained
evidence does not violate the Constitution because the judiciary can
simply close its eyes to the origins of that evidence." Leon and its
progeny implicitly employ this fragmentary conception as they
distance whether a judicial sanction is appropriate from whether
police violated the Fourth Amendment.1 2
The fragmentary conception conceives of the Fourth Amendment
not as directly regulating the judiciary but rather as directly regulating
the executive branch."' The fragmentary conception requires judicial
action only when violations by a co-equal branch become
intolerable."' Adopting the fragmentary conception and the secondary
judicial-enforcement role repositions the Court's institutional Fourth
Amendment role vis-A-vis the executive." 5 In Payner v. United States,"6
Chief Justice Burger wrote separately to explain the separation of
powers concerns that underpin the fragmentary conception in the
Fourth Amendment context:
Orderly government under our system of separate powers calls
for internal self-restraint and discipline in each Branch; this
"o Id.
"I See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1974).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (holding that
whether courts must exclude evidence is a separate question from whether the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated).
" Compare Calandra, 414 U.S. at 353-54 (describing Fourth Amendment as
regulating only executive branch intrusion), with id. at 357-58 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the exclusionary rule "enable[s] the judiciary to avoid the
taint of partnership in official lawlessness"); see also Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53,
at 255-57 (identifying fragmentary conception as critical difference between the
majority and dissent in Calandra). Leaving aside the Warrant Clause, reading the
Fourth Amendment to primarily regulate the executive branch is grounded in the
constitutional text. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .").
11 See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 256-57.
"' See Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the
Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIo ST.
J. CRIM. L. 393, 402-03 (2013) (explaining that through Mapp in 1961, the
exclusionary rule was seen as implementing the "judiciary's need to stand as a
'guardian' to ensure that the other branches stayed within their constitutional
mandates"); see also Morrison, supra note 46, at 1225 ("In every area of constitutional
law, the Supreme Court's doctrine reflects its institutional limitations.").
116 Payner v. United States, 447 U.S. 774 (1980).
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Court has no general supervisory authority over operations of
the Executive Branch, as it has with respect to the federal
courts. I agree fully with the Court that the exclusionary rule
is inapplicable to a case of this kind, but that should not be
read as condoning the conduct of the IRS "private
investigators" as disclosed by this record, or as approval of
their evidence-gathering methods."'
This first sentence explicitly embraces the fragmentary conception and
the idea that the judiciary should not police every error of the
executive branch. Rather, the executive branch should primarily
police its own house. Burger addressed the scope of the supervisory
power in Payner; nonetheless, his explanation that the Court's
decision not to judicially suppress unconstitutionally-obtained
evidence should not be read to condone the officers' evidence
gathering methods strongly supports the notion that judicial
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment should be secondary to
broader executive branch enforcement.
But this fragmentary conception has no bearing on the relationship
between police officers and prosecutors within the executive branch,"
as the ethical standards recognize,119 and as Burger recognized when
he distinguished the propriety of the investigators' conduct from the
propriety of judicial suppression resulting from that conduct.120
Although courts may be able to avert their eyes to the origins of the
evidence that prosecutors present, prosecutors cannot. Indeed, Justice
Brandeis recognized in Olmstead v. United Statesl2 1 that for the
Department of Justice to avail itself of the fruits of a Fourth
Amendment intrusion to obtain a conviction would assume moral
11 Id. at 737-38 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
118 See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 75, at 1626 (labeling police-prosecutor
relationship an "obvious assembly line from street to prison"); Schrock & Welsh,
supra note 53, at 289 (analyzing Calandra's reasoning: "the executive is the sole
addressee of the fourth amendment: courts are addressed only as warrant-issuing
magistrates" (emphasis added)).
119 See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-1.3 (Nat'1 Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009) ("A
prosecutor is ultimately responsible for evidence that will be used in a criminal case. A
prosecutor who knows or who is aware of a substantial risk that an investigation has
been conducted in an improper manner, or that evidence has been illegally-obtained
by law enforcement, must take affirmative steps to investigate and remediate such
problems."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002) (noting
that prosecutor may be required to undertake procedural and remedial measures as
matter of obligation in response to lack of procedural justice).
120 Payner, 447 U.S. at 737-38.
121 Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
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responsibility for the officers' crimes. Weeks and other early
exclusionary rule cases reasoned that admitting unconstitutionally-
obtained evidence violates judicial integrity and taints the judiciary
with the executive's unclean hands. 2 1 Under the fragmentary
conception of the federal government, it seems plausible to say that
the taint of a violation does not run between branches of government
from the police to the judiciary; " judicial suppression is therefore not
required for every illegality. 12  These reasons that courts need not
suppress all unconstitutionally-obtained evidence do not apply with
the same force to prosecutors within the executive branch."'
The Court's rationale behind its deferential exclusionary rule
jurisprudence most closely resembles the reasoning behind qualified
immunity. In both instances, the Court allows executive branch
officers to do their jobs without judicial micromanagement.' The
concept of offering breathing space to the executive branch in Fourth
Amendment enforcement also underlies Anthony O'Rourke's recent
article in which he argues that in criminal procedure the Court
122 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
123 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 257-60, 282. The judicial integrity notion
appears from the judicial exclusionary rule's beginnings, Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392-94 (1914), and in subsequent cases for more than a half-century. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 660
(1961); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Burger, supra note 54, at 5 (Weeks relies on judicial integrity
rationale); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to
Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 750-51 (1966) ("Also present [in Mapp] is
the notion of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead, that 'the government ought
not to use evidence obtained . . . by a criminal act,' lest by such use the government
ratify the illegality and become a lawbreaker." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Olmstead,
277 U.S. 438)).
124 See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
125 The judicial integrity rationale for exclusion as a matter of judicially-
enforceable right was relegated to the dissent in Calandra and more recent cases. See,
e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151-52 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating that exclusionary rule "'enables the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership
in official lawlessness,"' and it "'assures the people-all potential victims of unlawful
government conduct-that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior,
thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government."
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(alterations omitted)).
126 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 150 (1936)
(explaining that prosecutor's non-participation in the illegality had no bearing on her
ethical obligations); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL
INVESTIGATIONS § 3.5(b) (2008) (requiring prosecutors to limit taint from illegally-
obtained evidence).
127 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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delegates enforcement responsibility to executive officials."' He
explains that Herring is best read as ceding the judiciary's authority to
enforce negligent constitutional violations to law enforcement. 29
Although O'Rourke does not say as much, his delegation paradigm
equates to judicial underenforcement coupled with executive
enforcement of the full breadth of the constitutional norm.13 0
This judicial deference also emerges out of concern for the Court's
institutional legitimacy. When explaining the costs of the exclusionary
rule, Stone v. Powell'3 1 articulates the concern that judicial suppression
would "generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of
justice." 3 2 This abstract statement seems to hinge on the idea that
judicial suppression of relevant evidence would undermine judicial
legitimacy. In other cases the Court has defined the cost of judicial
suppression as "imped[ing] unacceptably the truth-finding functions
of judge and jury,"3 1 which similarly seems concerned that the public
would perceive the judiciary as standing in the way of truth.
As further evidence that the right-remedy divide is institutional
rather than analytical and therefore has no bearing on executive
branch constitutional duties, it is important to consider what it means
for something to be an exception to the exclusionary rule. Exceptions
to the exclusionary rule come into play only when a court first holds
(or assumes) that the Fourth Amendment was violated and must then
decide whether to provide a remedy; exclusionary rule exceptions are
therefore definitionally independent of substantive Fourth
Amendment analysis, which makes them necessarily not analytical.134
128 Anthony O'Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407 (2013).
129 Id. at 411-12.
130 O'Rourke cites Sager's Fair Measure at several turns. Id. at 420 n.42, 421 n.48,
469 n.261.
131 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
132 Id. at 491.
133 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
134 This divide is not identical to the underenforcement Sager described because
the Court occasionally speaks in dictum to whether Fourth Amendment rights were
violated even when it concludes that judicial exclusion is inappropriate for reasons
rooted solely in the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,
2428 (2011) (explaining that the question before the Court is whether the
exclusionary rule should apply even though "the search turned out to be
unconstitutional").
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B. Full Breadth of Fourth Amendment Norm
When the Supreme Court pared back the scope of the judicially-
enforced exclusionary rule for institutional reasons, it left intact the
more majestic Fourth Amendment as the full breadth of the
constitutional norm but rendered it underenforced. An important part
of this more majestic conception was that the government should not
benefit from invading the rights of its citizens by using evidence
gathered from that invasion to obtain a conviction. 13' Notably, despite
the recoiling of the judicial role policing Fourth Amendment
violations, neither Weeks nor Silverthorne Lumber and their holdings
that the Fourth Amendment prevents the government from benefitting
from a violation have ever been overruled. With a few carve-outs
discussed in this section, these older cases continue to provide the full
breadth of the constitutional norm; Calandra, Leon, and their progeny
did not alter or even address the full scope of the norm. Rather,
exclusionary rule cases beginning with Calandra addressed only the
scope of judicial enforcement. 136
Having established this framework for analyzing executive branch
Fourth Amendment duties, it is worth considering how to think about
each of the doctrinal exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Some
exceptions since Weeks and Silverthorne Lumber define the scope of
the Fourth Amendment right, while others limit merely its remedy. To
enforce the full breadth of the constitutional norm, when analyzing
administrative suppression prosecutors should consider only rights-
defining exceptions. Because Calandra and Leon expressly severed
Fourth Amendment rights from remedies,"' their remedial holdings
do not constrict the scope of Fourth Amendment rights. In contrast,
Weeks and other pre-Calandra exclusionary rule cases speak to both
rights and remedies because these cases treated rights and remedies as
intertwined."' Determining whether the existing doctrinal exceptions
to the exclusionary rule are rights based or remedies based accordingly
requires parsing the language in decisions that created these
exceptions with an eye to whether they preceded or followed
Calandra.
1 See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
136 See supra Part II.A.
' Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)
(not suppressing evidence "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words");
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (allowing use of unconstitutionally-
obtained evidence renders Fourth Amendment meaningless).
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Exceptions that limit the scope of the right include attenuation,
standing, independent source, and impeachment. Prosecutors should
accordingly consider these exceptions when analyzing whether to
administratively suppress evidence. Exceptions that limit only the
judicial remedy that prosecutors should therefore not consider in
analyzing administrative suppression include: good faith, grand jury
questioning, and inevitable discovery.
Taking these in turn, prosecutors are constitutionally required to
administratively suppress evidence only if it is "fruit of the poisonous
tree" not sufficiently attenuated from the violation based on judicial
precedent defining the limits to attenuation. 139 The Supreme Court
explained the contours of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and
its attenuation limit in Wong Sun v. United States,140 which preceded
Calandra.' Unlike Calandra, Wong Sun did not explain the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent for officer misconduct but rather cited
Weeks for the notion that "evidence seized during an unlawful search
could not constitute proof against the victim of the search."' Wong
Sun then quoted Silverthorne Lumber for the proposition that "[tihe
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is . . . that it shall not be used at all."141 It is in this context
rather than one focused on whether deterrence is sufficiently
important to warrant a prudential remedy of suppression that the
Court crafts Wong Sun's attenuation limit." For that reason, the
exception is rights based and prosecutors need not administratively
suppress evidence that is sufficiently attenuated from what they
conclude to be a constitutional violation. 4 5
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment standing doctrine also limits the
scope of the right rather than merely its remedy. Like Wong Sun,
Alderman v. United States' explains the exclusionary rule within the
Weeks/Silverthorne Lumber line of cases and precedes Calandra.147
More specifically, Alderman explains that "any petitioner would be
139 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 491 (1963).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 471.
142 Id. at 484.
143 Id. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
144 See id. at 488.
145 It is not, however, inconceivable to view attenuation in Wong Sun as limiting
judicial remedy rather than right even though the Court had not yet articulated the
Fourth Amendment right-remedy divide.
16 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
147 Id. at 171-72.
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entitled to the suppression of government evidence originating in
electronic surveillance violative of his own Fourth Amendment
right."148 This language explicitly addresses the scope of the Fourth
Amendment right itself insofar as it speaks to "entitlement" to
suppression and expressly addresses whose rights were violated.
Moreover, Alderman's statement that Fourth Amendment rights are
personal and "may not be vicariously asserted"149 also speaks to the
scope of the right. For these reasons, prosecutors should
administratively suppress evidence from use only against those
defendants who would have standing to challenge an unlawful search
or seizure.
Evidence obtained from a source independent of the Fourth
Amendment violation also need not be administratively suppressed
because the independent source doctrine too limits the scope of the
Fourth Amendment right. The Court created the independent source
exception in Silverthorne Lumber in the same paragraph in which it
explained that "[the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all."150 To read this paragraph of Silverthorne Lumber as internally
consistent requires viewing the independent source doctrine as
standing for the largely uncontroversial proposition that the Fourth
Amendment right requires exclusion only of evidence derived from
the violation and not unrelated evidence. In other words, evidence
obtained from an independent source does not constitute "evidence so
acquired" 5 ' and therefore falls outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, prosecutors need not administratively
suppress evidence obtained from a source independent of what they
determine to be a Fourth Amendment violation.
Lastly, permitting the use of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence
for impeachment also limits the scope of the Fourth Amendment right
rather than merely its remedy. As with the other rights-based
exceptions, the case that created the impeachment exception, Walder
v. United States,"' preceded Calandra and relies on the
14 Id. at 176.
1' Id. at 174.
1o Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920)
(emphasis added); see also Clancy, supra note 70, at 389 (explaining that independent
source doctrine "has a long pedigree, with roots in case law" that treated exclusion as
a constitutional right).
1 Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.
152 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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Weeks/Silverthorne Lumber line of cases considering exclusion as part
of the Fourth Amendment right.'" The impeachment exception relies
on the notion that an amendment protecting the security of persons,
houses, papers, and effects should not provide "a shield against
contradiction of . .. untruths"' because that outcome would
"perver[t] the Fourth Amendment."' 55 In other words, the Fourth
Amendment itself does not condone perjury. Accordingly, while
prosecutors should not charge a case based on evidence that they
conclude was obtained unconstitutionally, if they can ethically charge
and pursue a case based on evidence that was obtained
constitutionally they need not refrain from using unconstitutionally-
obtained evidence solely for impeachment purposes.
In contrast, prosecutors cannot rely on the good faith exceptions to
use unconstitutionally-obtained evidence. For reasons explained
above, allowing the use of evidence obtained by officers relying in
good faith on a warrant or a police warrant clerk are remedy-based
exceptions to the exclusionary rule and not the Fourth Amendment
right.'56 Similar reasoning applies to reliance on court clerks: Arizona
v. Evans5 1 created that exception because suppression would not
sufficiently deter police misconduct.15" Relatedly, prosecutors cannot
constitutionally charge cases based on evidence obtained
unconstitutionally but in good-faith reliance on binding judicial
precedent or a statute. As to binding judicial precedent, Davis v. United
States'59 was quite forthright that the question for the Court was a
remedial one: should the exclusionary rule apply even though "the
search turned out to be unconstitutional."6 o Regarding reliance on a
statute, Illinois v. Krull16 1 too relies on the Leon remedy-based inquiry
of whether exclusion would sufficiently deter police misconduct to
justify the costs of exclusion.'
153 Id. at 64-65.
154 Id. at 65.
15 Id.
156 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
... Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
158 Id. at 10-16.
15 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
'6 Id. at 2428.
161 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
162 Id. at 349-55.
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As also explained in detail above, prosecutors cannot rely on
unconstitutionally-obtained evidence before the grand jury because
Calandra's holding was remedy rather than rights-based.16
Inevitable discovery too does not apply to administrative
suppression of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence as it does to
judicial exclusion. Much like the good faith cases, the case that created
the inevitable discovery exception, Nix v. Williams," relies on a
prudential cost-benefit analysis of whether suppression would be
worth the cost to the courts."' If the discovery of evidence can be
shown inevitable, the Court explained, "the deterrence rationale has
so little basis that the evidence should be received."'6 6 Although
inevitable discovery is somewhat related to the independent source
exception,167 which does define the contours of the right,168 they are
not coextensive.' The "functional similarity" that the Court describes
between the two doctrines does not counsel similar treatment because
the reasoning underlying inevitable discovery and independent source
is not in fact coextensive. Evidence obtained from an actually
independent source is not the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation
at all and therefore does not implicate Fourth Amendment rights.
Evidence that was the fruit of a violation that a court concludes
hypothetically could have been-but was not-obtained legally is
evidence for which the Court pragmatically concluded that judicial
suppression would not pay its way. Accordingly, prosecutors should
not rely on inevitable discovery to excuse administrative suppression.
Taking the older cases together with the modern exclusionary rule
cases leaves an underenforced Fourth Amendment that precludes the
government from benefitting from an illegal search or seizure by using
not-sufficiently-attenuated fruits of the poisonous tree against the
victim of the constitutional violation for non-impeachment purposes."'o
1 Supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
'6 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
165 Id. at 442-44.
166 Id. at 444.
167 See id. at 443-44 (describing "functional similarity"). Inevitable discovery is also
sometimes known as "hypothetical independent source." State v. Williams, 285
N.W.2d 248, 256 (Iowa 1979) (emphasis added).
16 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
169 Nix holds that the questioned evidence is admissible based on the inevitable
discovery exception even though it was not in fact obtained from an independent
source. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44.
170 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93
(1914); supra notes 139-169 and accompanying text.
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Yet it is no longer the judiciary's role to enforce this no-benefit
proposition in every instance.17' Instead, it is prosecutors, as members
of the executive branch tasked with enforcing the full breadth of the
constitutional norm who must administratively suppress such evidence
even though the judiciary would not suppress it.172
This conception of prosecutors' Fourth Amendment obligations
establishes that prosecutors should consider rights-based exceptions to
per se excluding all evidence that they adjudge to be
unconstitutionally-obtained. Prosecutors' ethical obligations, however,
exceed that constitutional floor and impose a broader responsibility of
administrative suppression. The bases and scope of this ethical
responsibility will be analyzed in greater detail below.173 For now,
suffice it to say that unlike the constitutional obligation, prosecutors'
ethical responsibilities require them to administratively suppress all
fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation. The only exclusionary rule
exception that this ethical obligation preserves is independent source:
evidence obtained in a manner unrelated to a constitutional violation
need not be administratively suppressed."'
Even some of those who accept that the Court has not addressed the
full breadth of the Fourth Amendment right since Calandra because it
17' E.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984). In some respects, this divide between executive and
judicial power is similar to the Court's role enforcing the Fourth Amendment against
the states during the Wolf pre-incorporation era. MACLIN, supra note 1, at 43-52
(explaining that during pre-incorporation era Court enforced Fourth Amendment
violations only when they were sufficiently extreme as to shock the conscience); see
also, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that federal court
would prevent use of evidence obtained by local sheriffs officers because forcing open
the defendant's mouth and forcibly extracting the contents of his stomach, all without
a warrant, shocks the conscience).
172 Marc Miller and Ron Wright seem to briefly allude to a concept of
administrative suppression as having constitutional grounding when they mention
that the executive branch might refrain from using evidence because of its "principled
allegiance to constitutional ideals" rather than merely in anticipation of an
unfavorable judicial ruling. Miller & Wright, Black Box, supra note 2, at 139; see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 816-19
(1994) (advocating different Fourth Amendment responsibilities for judicial and
executive branches).
1' See infra Part III.
"7 Labeling the independent source doctrine an exception to the exclusionary rule
is a misnomer in any event because under that doctrine a constitutional violation is
not the but-for cause of police obtaining the evidence in question. See, e.g., Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984) (allowing admissibility of evidence seized
pursuant to valid warrant despite earlier unlawful entry into same premises because
earlier entry was unrelated to basis of warrant).
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could not as a matter of separation of powers'7 5 might contend that
Weeks and the other early exclusionary rule cases were simply wrong
to conclude that the no-benefit proposition is any necessary part of the
Fourth Amendment. The debate over whether the Fourth Amendment
itself requires the government to refrain from using evidence or from
benefitting from a violation has been well plowed and need not be
rehashed in detail here.176 This Article sides with Schrock and Welsh's
contention that due process requires that the government observe its
Constitution in prosecuting its citizens, which includes not using
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the
victim of the violation."' It is also sympathetic to Silverthorne Lumber's
15 See supra note 90.
176 Compare, e.g., Bloom & Fentin, supra note 1, at 73 ("It is the Fourth
Amendment right, not the exclusionary rule, that demands the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence."), id. at 75 ("If we are to take seriously the court's duty to protect
our constitutional rights and preserve its sanctimonious role in the administration of
justice, then courts must utilize the remedy of exclusion for acknowledged Fourth
Amendment violations."), Kamisar, supra note 53, at 640 ("1 believe that the goals
'uppermost in the minds of the framers of the rule' were 'enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness' and 'assuring the people . . . that
the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
of seriously undermining popular trust in government."' (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting))), Wayne R. LaFave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith,"
43 U. PITT. L. REv. 307, 361 (1982) (" [Wle would be illadvised to tamper with the
sanction of exclusion, without which the fourth amendment would be only 'a form of
words."' (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961))), Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 53, at 371 ("[Tlhe defendant has a due process personal right to have the
government observe its own laws, at any rate its own constitution, in its prosecution
of him-and therefore to have the court exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence
..... ), and Stewart, supra note 52, at 1389 ("1 agree with lMapp's] conclusion that the
exclusionary rule is necessary to keep the right of privacy secured by the fourth
amendment from 'remaining an empty promise."' (footnotes omitted)), with, e.g.,
Amar, supra note 172, at 785 (the Court "has concocted the awkward and
embarrassing remedy of excluding reliable evidence of criminal guilt, and has then
tried to water down this awkward and embarrassing remedy in ad hoc ways"), and
Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 527 (2013) ("While the Fourth Amendment may demand
some remedy for unreasonable search and seizure to make that prohibition
meaningful, it does not follow that the requisite remedy is exclusion.").
1" Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 371. Richard Re has recently developed this
due process basis for the exclusionary rule in much greater detail. See Re, supra note
72. Whether the origin of exclusion on this theory is properly seated in the Fourth
Amendment itself or in the Due Process Clauses insofar as those provisions guarantee
that the government must abide by specific constitutional protections such as the
Fourth Amendment seems largely semantic and irrelevant to the discussion of
prosecutors' administrative suppression duties. See id. at 6 (criticizing commentators
and judges for suggesting that the Fourth Amendment itself requires suppression
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principle that the Fourth Amendment itself requires exclusion lest that
fundamental right become a mere form of words.178
To exercise this duty of administrative suppression, prosecutors
must make their own determination of whether evidence was obtained
unconstitutionally. Prosecutors may not be better at interpreting the
Fourth Amendment than neutral magistrates; indeed, several
prosecutors reviewed the defective warrant application in Leon.'7 ' But
prosecutor review is not intended as a substitute for judicial review.
Involving prosecutors as a second, serial layer of the warrant review
process should improve accuracy. 80
The notion that administrative requirements within the executive
branch might provide at least as much protection for defendants as
does judicial review is not foreign to search and seizure law. In the
Title III wiretap context, Congress implemented heightened statutory
protections including administrative protections within the executive
rather than combination of Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clauses). Although
Re's explanation of the due process origin of the exclusionary rule is valuable, the
notion that seating exclusion in due process spawns exceptions to the exclusionary
rule is less convincing.
178 Other remedies for Fourth Amendment violations have proven nearly
meaningless in practice. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment remedies other than exclusionary rule have proven "worthless and
futile"); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920)
(allowing government to benefit from illegal seizure of evidence "reduces the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words"); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)
("If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution."); Bloom & Fentin, supra note 1, at 75-76 (exclusion is the only
effective Fourth Amendment remedy); see also Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 75, at
1611 ("[Wihat cannot be denied is that no alternative to exclusion has attracted
sufficient support to see it implemented."). The Supreme Court plays a "shell game"
with Fourth Amendment rights in which it claims that civil suits adequately substitute
for suppression yet makes such suits more difficult to sustain. Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-
Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First Century,
78 UMKC L. REv. 875, 882 (2010); accord Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61
EMORY LJ. 69, 90 (2011) (quoting Karlan, supra); see also Justin F. Marceau, The
Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv. 687, 711 (2011) ("The net
effect of these procedures is the creation of a constitutional three-way stop, and there
is no movement in any direction because each wrongly creates the illusion that the
other has the right of way."). Alternative remedies are particularly meager for illegal
searches. Stuntz, supra note 51, at 918-19.
179 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 902 (1984).
1I See Daniel C. Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 796 (2003) [hereinafter Prosecutors and Their
Agents].
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branch."' The Department of Justice has gone even further than
Congress."' To obtain a Title Ill wiretap, a federal agent must first
receive approval of an Assistant United States Attorney who must
submit an application to the Office of Enforcement Operations in the
Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Criminal Division of the DOJ.8
Pursuant to statute, the application then requires approval of a high-
ranking DOJ official."' Accordingly, as with the mandatory
administrative procedures in the Title III context, administrative
suppression within the executive branch will likely provide additional
protections for defendants' rights beyond that which the judiciary
provides."
Requiring prosecutors to make this administrative suppression
decision is consistent with prosecutors' widely acknowledged' 6 duties
as members of the executive branch to interpret the Constitution.8
This interpretive duty emerges from the duty to enforce the law
because the executive must enforce the law within constitutional
boundaries."
18 Derik Fettig, When "Good Faith" Makes Sense: Applying Leon's Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule to the Government's Reasonable Reliance on Title III Wiretap Orders,
49 HARv. J. LEGIS. 373, 397 (2012); see Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 801(b), (d), 82 Stat. 197, 211-12.
182 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 91, § 9-7.010.
113 Id. § 9-7.110; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 90 (2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usaoleousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00090.
htm; Fettig, supra note 181, at 397-98.
'8 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2012).
185 See Fettig, supra note 181, at 400 (explaining that it is much easier to obtain a
search warrant than wiretap authority).
186 E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 292-96; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 90, at 221; Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the
Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REv. 676, 687 (2005); Michel Rosenfeld,
Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional
Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 137, 138 (1993) (citing
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 21-28 (12th ed. 1991)).
187 See Morrison, supra note 46, at 1226 ("[Tlhe executive branch (through the
President) does have an independent responsibility to interpret and implement the
Constitution, and . . ,depending on the constitutional norm involved, the executive's
responsibility may entail enforcing the norm more robustly than the courts would.").
'8 Meese, supra note 90, at 985-86; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra
note 90, at 221; Pillard, supra note 186, at 687; Rosenfeld, supra note 186, at 138; see
also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (President must take an oath to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States"); id. § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .").
2014] 1623
University of California, Davis
The executive branch has essentially complete authority vis-A-vis the
other branches as to whether and how to prosecute federal cases...
limited only by extremely deferential judicial boundaries against
overreach." This authority includes the power to conclude that a
substantive law is unconstitutional and therefore decline to prosecute
anyone under that law. President Jefferson refused to enforce the
Sedition Act for that reason."' In fact, the executive branch is not only
permitted to refuse enforcement of laws that it concludes are
unconstitutional but may be required to do so.1 92 Executive authority
over prosecutions also includes authority to refrain from using
evidence in any prosecution that is expressly rendered admissible by a
statute that the executive concludes is unconstitutional. For example,
since 1968 every presidential administration has refused to rely on the
statute designed to supersede Miranda v. Arizona' because they
concluded that it was unconstitutional."' As Erwin Chemerinsky
explains, both the executive and judicial branches must concur to
enforce a criminal law, so either branch can interpret the Constitution
to block its enforcement.19 5
189 Brief of Benjamin R. Civiletti Amicus Curiae in Support of the United States at 11-
12, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) ("Th[e] principle of
judicial non-interference extends to such basic subjects as what evidence to introduce
[or] what witnesses to call . . . ."); Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 292-93 ("The choice
of whether to proceed with a criminal case and the decisions about how to do so are thus
entirely within the discretion of the executive branch."); see also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("IT]he executive branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .").
190 There is a narrow judicial check on selective prosecution based on suspect or
quasi-suspect class status. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
191 Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 90, at 255; see also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 707 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (" [T]he executive can decline
to prosecute under unconstitutional statutes."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 907 (1990) (explaining that the President can
effectively nullify statutes by refusing to prosecute); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310, 311
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) ("[T]he Executive, believing the law to be
unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it[;] because that power has
been confided to him by the Constitution.").
192 See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 296; Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinion from
the Office of Legal Counsel to the Honorable AbnerJ. Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REV. 313, 315-17
(1995).
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012).
1 Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 289-90. In 2000, the Supreme Court endorsed
the executive's interpretation and held the Miranda-repealer unconstitutional in
relevant part. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
195 Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 295; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1041 (2006) ("[A] criminal
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The executive duty to interpret the Constitution extends not only to
the chief executive but also to prosecutors in individual cases.' 96 As
Strauss explains, "whenever a federal law enforcement officer decides
whether there is probable cause for an arrest, the executive branch has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment."'9 7 Similarly, for prosecutors to
determine whether evidence in their cases was obtained
constitutionally-and therefore whether they may use it consistent
with the Fourth Amendment-merely asks prosecutors to interpret
the Constitution to enforce the law.
This interpretive duty and correlative duty of administrative
suppression applies to state prosecutors just as it does to federal
prosecutors.' 8 Michael Paulsen concludes that state executive officials
have the same interpretive duties to the federal Constitution as do
federal officials because the Oath Clause of Article VI requires state
and federal officials to take an oath to uphold the federal
Constitution.'" But even without the Oath Clause, it is indisputable
that state and local police officers are bound by the Fourth
Amendment through incorporation. 2 00 And Strauss's point that every
federal officer interprets the Constitution when she makes an arrest 20'
applies equally to state and local officers. State and local prosecutors
too are bound by the Fourth Amendment through incorporation, and
conviction usually requires affirmative approval by all branches of government . . . .").
196 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (individual prosecutor may decide not to enforce or to underenforce law
that she believes is unconstitutional); id. at 1205 (executive "Take Care" duty can be
delegated to prosecutors); John Stick, He Doth Protest Too Much: Moderating Meese's
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1987) (citing Kent
Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality-Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV.
177, 217 (1981)) (arguing that prosecutor may take her personal views of
constitutionality of a criminal statute into account even if the Supreme Court has
upheld that statute); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1243, 1252 (2011) (discussing "prosecutorial nullification," meaning when
prosecutor declines to prosecute because of disagreement with the law or belief that
its application would be unwise or unfair).
19 Strauss, supra note 48, at 114.
198 See Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture Constitutional
Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 180 (1986) (the Constitution "implies that all
legislators and public officials, both state and federal, are obligated to interpret the
Constitution" (emphasis added)).
199 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2706, 2735-37 (2003); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 90, at 314
n.332; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
2" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961).
201 Strauss, supra note 48, at 114.
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any Fourth Amendment duty to refrain from using evidence applies to
them just as to federal prosecutors because of incorporation.
Articulating prosecutors' duty to interpret the Constitution to
determine whether the evidence in their cases was obtained
constitutionally is not intended to widely embrace a vision of
prosecutors having truly independent constitutional authority to
depart from settled judicial interpretations.20 2 Rather, it simply asks
prosecutors to conduct ordinary constitutional interpretation by
applying existing judicial precedent regarding the scope of the Fourth
Amendment right to the facts of their cases.
In this "ordinary" mode of executive interpretation, because of the
right-remedy divide, prosecutors analyzing administrative suppression
will frequently face thorny questions of whether discussion of Fourth
Amendment rights in a particular case is holding or dictum. Courts
can (and do) simply assume without deciding that the Fourth
Amendment was violated in a particular instance but that suppression
is unnecessary."' The holding in such cases speaks only to the
remedial doctrine. In other instances, however, courts may announce
that a defendant's rights were (or were not) violated as they also
decide that suppression is unnecessary for some remedial reason such
as good faith.204 When a court concludes that the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated but that it nonetheless need not
suppress evidence-as it did in Davis-the conclusion that the
defendant's rights were violated is dictum. The court could simply
have assumed it in reaching the same result. When a court concludes
that the defendant's rights were not violated, it may be difficult to
know whether the right or remedy conclusion represents the holding.
202 There is extensive literature addressing how much deference executive officials
owe to judicial interpretations, including whether judicial interpretations bind
executive officials. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1359 (1997) (arguing that
executive officials are bound by judicial decisions); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 90, at 334-35, 344 (arguing that executive officials owe judicial
decisions "very high respect" but are not bound by them); Rosenfeld, supra note 186,
at 173 (executive officials owe obligation to judicial precedent equal to members of
Supreme Court); Strauss, supra note 48, at 127 (same).
203 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (assuming Fourth
Amendment violation); see also Marceau, supra note 178, at 733-42 (describing courts'
reliance on exceptions to exclusionary rule to avoid deciding existence of Fourth
Amendment violations); id. at 732 (explaining that addressing "the merits of the
Fourth Amendment" without any available remedy would be pure dictum).
20 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (explaining that
the question before the Court is whether the exclusionary rule should apply even
though "the search turned out to be unconstitutional").
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Once a prosecutor separates holding from dictum, the question
remains how much deference prosecutors should give dictum
addressing the scope of the Fourth Amendment right. They should
treat dictum defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment right as do
lower federal courts.20 5 To the extent that it conflicts with prior
holdings, dictum should not serve as a basis for administrative
suppression decisions. But to the extent that dictum is consistent with
prior holdings, is carefully considered, and illuminates questions as to
which there is no binding holding in the jurisdiction, dictum merits
considerable weight.
If prosecutors were to base their administrative suppression
decisions on existing case law that approach could potentially prompt
the judiciary to more frequently adjudicate the scope of a defendant's
rights rather than simply holding that no remedy would apply
regardless of a violation because the practical impact of those judicial
decisions would increase significantly.20 ' Additional rights-based
adjudications would promote Fourth Amendment law development
and could prevent future rights violations by adding clarity.2 07 A more
potent executive-branch remedy for a constitutional violation might
205 See, e.g., Winslow v. FERC, 587 F.3d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ('"[CIarefully
considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must
be treated as authoritative."'); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir.
1996) ("[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly
as by the Court's outright holdings. . . ."); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13,
19 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[M]uch depends on the character of the dictum. Mere obiter may
be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered statement though technically
dictum, must carry great weight, and may even be regarded as conclusive." (internal
quotation marks and omissions deleted)); United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Supreme Court dictum "must be given considerable weight").
206 See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 463 (2009) (broad reading of Herring's good faith exception would
"block judicial development of the law of search and seizure"); see also Nancy Leong,
Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 413 (2012) ("Rights-making is so important that
in many circumstances it trumps other reservations we may have about various
disadvantages associated with [rights before remedy] qualified immunity
adjudication.").
207 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (deciding scope of right
before availability of remedy "promotes the development of constitutional
precedent"); Jack M. Beerman, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 139, 149 (explaining importance of deciding right before remedy to law
development); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A
Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
237, 253-57 (analyzing problems with existing criminal and civil remedies
jurisprudence in facilitating Fourth Amendment law development).
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mitigate the lack of incentive that a weak judicial remedy creates for
defendants to "seek the law's elaboration. 208
Administrative suppression should incorporate an administrative
law separation-of-functions construct: the prosecutor who analyzes
the need for administrative suppression should not be someone who
was involved in authorizing or advising regarding the searches or
seizures in question. 209 The second prosecutor's review would not be
as badly skewed by tunnel vision or confirmation bias as would a
prosecutor involved earlier in the case, and the anticipation of this
second prosecutor's review should have a debiasing effect on the first
prosecutor's decisionmaking.2o Moreover, separation of functions is
consistent with already existing ethical precepts for prosecutors 211 and
208 Karlan, supra note 178, at 887-88 (internal quotations omitted). These
additional rights-based adjudications could redound to the detriment of defendants
because courts are inclined to rule against guilty defendants caught red-handed.
Stuntz, supra note 51, at 883-84, 912-13; see also Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the
Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 39 (2013) (court's knowledge that defendant was
caught with contraband has tendency to sway court in favor of government on Fourth
Amendment issue). In that respect, Fourth Amendment rights adjudication in
criminal cases seems rather different than in civil cases with innocent plaintiffs. See
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98-
100 (1999) (explaining that reducing cost of finding constitutional violation allows
constitutional law to grow and develop).
209 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 898 (2009) ("[Pirosecutors who are
involved with the investigation of a case-including involvement in any decision
about a case that is made pre-indictment, such as decisions to seek warrants or to
bring someone before a grand jury-should be prevented from making adjudicative
decisions."). A panel of prosecutors would probably bring greater accuracy to
administrative suppression decisions, see id. at 901, but that may be impractical in
many instances.
210 See DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA'S RACE TO CONVICT AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 26, 128 (2012); Alafair S. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive
Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 525-26 (2007)
[hereinafter, Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias]; see also id. at 516-18 (explaining
belief perseverance, cognitive bias, selective information processing, and tunnel vision
in prosecutorial context); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 79, 95 (2010) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Agnosticism] (" [Blelief perseverance
describes the tendency of people to adhere to their prior beliefs even when
contradictory evidence firmly refutes them."); Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
supra note 180, at 803 (" [Pirosecutors who have helped call the shots in an
investigation will be hard pressed to retain their magisterial perspective not just about
the tactics used in the investigation, but about whether charges should be pursued
thereafter."); Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception:
Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 880, 881 (1975).
211 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.2(e)
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with prosecutors' existing duties to independently assess their cases.212
Prosecutors' offices could be well served to designate a group of
prosecutors as the administrative suppression analysts, who could
develop greater Fourth Amendment expertise and would be further
removed from the adversarial cauldron.213
Even if the prosecutor believes that a search or seizure was
unconstitutional under existing law, she may nonetheless rely on the
evidence if she can make a good-faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law that would render the search
or seizure constitutional.214  Although this good-faith argument
extension might seem to collapse administrative suppression decisions
onto judicial suppression, good-faith extension arguments under
administrative suppression apply only to constitutionality and not to
admissibility.
Requiring prosecutors to make administrative suppression decisions
would incorporate Fourth Amendment analysis into what scholars
have labeled our administrative system of criminal justice.215 Our
criminal justice system is largely administrative because prosecutors
make the important decisions subject to limited judicial review. 216 But
some important decisions, including decisions regarding
constitutionality of searches and seizures, remain largely exogenouS 217
to the current administrative model, which undermines their practical
(2008) ("Generally, the prosecutor engaged in an investigation should not be the sole
decision-maker regarding the decision to prosecute matters arising out of that
investigation.").
212 See id. H§ 1.3(a)(ii), 2.13(b)(i), 2.17(a); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(a) (2002); Recommendation, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM.JUST. REP. 105D, at 45.
213 See MEDWED, supra note 210, at 26 (suggesting that prosecutors' offices might
wish to designate charging specialists to provide independent viewpoint and
debiasing); cf. Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics 30 (Suffolk
Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 13-31, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2320605 (suggesting that lawyers seek second opinions
from objective observers as a way to minimize adversarial bias in determining what
the law permits).
214 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
215 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 29.
216 See sources cited supra note 30.
217 According to Miller & Wright, prosecutors do consider how courts would likely
rule on the admissibility of evidence, Miller & Wright, Black Box, supra note 2, at 138,
but unconstitutionality is not itself sufficient to result in inadmissibility. Moreover,
the "executive exclusionary rule" is predictive rather than adjudicative and is simply
meant to prevent prosecutors from wasting resources on motions they are likely to
lose; prosecutors may therefore opt to take the risk and try to use evidence even if
they as adjudicators would conclude it was unconstitutionally-obtained.
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import.118 Early plea agreements cause defendants to rarely file
suppression motions.219 The vast majority of state and federal
convictions result from guilty pleas.220 And because prosecutors seek
guilty pleas primarily to alleviate docket congestion,22 1 the sooner a
case can plead out the better. Accordingly, prosecutors frequently offer
favorable early plea deals. 2 Prosecutors sometimes offer deals that
expire223 or degrade 24 if a defendant files a suppression motion. Some
plea offers include recommending a time-served sentence. For the vast
majority of defendants incarcerated pending trial, time served is an
218 See Lynch, supra note 29.
219 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (plea bargaining "is the
criminal justice system" (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining
as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1388 (2012) ("[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.").
220 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485-86
(2010)); SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2010), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; Table 5.22.2009: Criminal Defendants
Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
221 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE
L.J. 857, 865 (2000) ("Prosecutors of the nineteenth century, like prosecutors today,
plea bargained to ease their crushing workloads, made heavier in the nineteenth
century both by their part-time status and utter lack of staff and by a caseload
explosion perhaps set off by newly founded police forces and massive immigration.");
Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
457, 466-67 (2013) (citing Fisher, supra).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Vanderwerff, No. 12-cr-00069, 2012 WL 2514933, at
*1 (D. Colo. June 28, 2012) (describing guilty plea based on plea agreement shortly
after indictment as "characteristic of modern criminal justice"); see also H. Mitchell
Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61
CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2011) (describing hypothetical prosecutor's "one-time offer");
George C. Thomas Ill, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1966 (2004)
(" [MIost of the cases will be plea bargained before any motion to suppress. . . .").
223 See J.A. Gilboy, Guilty Plea Negotiations and the Exclusionary Rule of Evidence: A
Case Study of Chicago Narcotics Courts, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 93-95
(1976); see also Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1407 (1986)
(plea bargaining may deter filing suppression motions because prosecutors may
retaliate).
224 See, e.g., Ann Marimow, Suspected D.C. Drug Kingpin Offered Plea Deal, WASH.
POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/suspected-dc-drug-
kingpin-offered-plea-deal/2013/01/16/7d8ddl96-601 1-1 1e2-9940-6fc488f3fecdstory.
html (explaining that defendant was offered shorter sentence under plea deal waiving
right to challenge use of wiretaps than under plea deal that preserved rights to
challenge wiretap and appeal).
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extremely welcome disposition.225 A defendant with a meritorious
suppression motion could rationally prefer going home on time served
than sitting in jail for the time necessary to brief, argue, and receive a
ruling on their motion, or perhaps through a full trial and appeal.2 26
For defendants without a nearly-bulletproof suppression motion, time
served is an offer they can't refuse. A defense attorney would have to
be extremely confident in a suppression motion and extremely
persuasive to convince his client to decline an early plea offer in favor
of filing a motion.22
Administrative suppression resembles some features of the
prosecutor "hard screening" procedure that Ron Wright and Marc
Miller advocate. 228 Hard screening requires prosecutors to take a hard
look at their cases at the charging stage and test various sources of
evidence rather than relying solely on the police file and the officers'
evaluation.2 29 Administrative suppression too requires prosecutors to
take a hard look at their cases at the charging stage beyond merely the
police report with a focus on the constitutionality of the searches and
seizures that generated their evidence. Hard screening also requires
"reasoned evaluation," meaning that prosecutors should not charge
every crime that seems provable but only those that "deserve
prosecution and punishment" and are resource justified. 23 0 Reasoned
evaluation supports prosecutors declining to charge even provable
cases.23 ' Although administrative suppression does not advocate a
225 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1136 (2008) ("The
trial course is long; even if convicted, the defendant often has already served any
postconviction sentence, and then some.... If the defendant can get a plea to a
misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the whole punishment.
Any plea that frees this defendant may be more than advisable-it may be salvation.");
see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROw 86 (2010) ("Never before in our
history, though, have such an extraordinary number of people felt compelled to plead
guilty, even if they are innocent .... ); MEDWED, supra note 210, at 53-54 (explaining
that a "sizable number" of innocent defendants plead guilty, and at least some of these
pleas are rational choices).
226 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). The time from an unsuccessful motion to a final
judgment on an appeal could be shortened if the defendant enters a conditional guilty
plea and reserves the right to appeal, see, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1855
(2011); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 442 (2010), but the appellate process may
still take years, which is a far cry from time served.
227 Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution,
32 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 321 (2005).
228 Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 28, at 104-10.
229 Id. at 104.
230 Id. at 105.
231 Id. at 106.
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focus based on just deserts, it similarly embraces the notion that some
charges should not be brought even if they could in fact be proven in
court with admissible evidence. Despite sufficiency of admissible
evidence, prosecutors should nonetheless-as a constitutionally-
required screening principle-refuse to charge cases that rely on what
prosecutors determine to be unconstitutionally-obtained evidence.
Although administrative suppression is not limited to the screening
decision, screening constitutes its most important application because
of the prevalence of guilty pleas.
To sum up Parts I and II together, the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the executive branch from using not-sufficiently-attenuated fruits of
an unconstitutional search against the victim of the constitutional
violation except for impeachment. 2 To implement this duty,
prosecutors must therefore determine whether the evidence in their
cases was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. If they
conclude that a piece of evidence was obtained unconstitutionally and
it does not fall within one of the rights-based limitations on
suppression, they must administratively suppress it even if the
judiciary would not suppress that evidence. That this executive duty
exceeds the judicial duty to enforce the Fourth Amendment is a facet
of underenforcement that emerges from the explicit divide between
Fourth Amendment rights and remedies.23 3 Calling on prosecutors to
interpret judicial precedent to determine when they must
administratively suppress evidence adheres to the well-accepted
notion that members of the executive branch must interpret the
Constitution. Accordingly, although the judiciary need not check a co-
equal branch of government to purge illicit governmental benefit by
excluding all unconstitutionally-obtained evidence, the executive is
constitutionally obligated to check itself in that manner. Indeed, "the
prosecutor" is the answer to then-Judge Burger's question: "who will
watch the watchman." 23 4
III. PROSECUTORS' ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES
In a brief informal opinion from 1936, the ABA recognized
prosecutors' ethical duty to refrain from using at least some admissible
232 See supra notes 52-65, 135-170 and accompanying text.
233 See SAGER, supra note 4, at 116 (where Court's decisions not intended to
exhaust full meaning of constitutional norm it is non-sequitur to limit political
branches to "deference-drenched" doctrine).
234 See Burger, supra note 54, at 2-3.
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but illegally-obtained evidence;23 however, the contours of that duty
were never articulated and it has never been theorized. This Article
posits that prosecutors' responsibilities to their constituencies to
promote rights protection and public safety provide a theoretical
justification for that duty. Prosecutors' role as an intra-executive
branch check to encourage police to comply with the law creates a
duty to administratively suppress all fruits of a constitutional
violation. The constitutional duty of administrative suppression
incorporates exceptions for attenuation, standing, independent source,
and impeachment. 236 The ethical duty exceeds that constitutional
floor, however, and allows for a so-called exception only when the
source of challenged evidence is actually independent of the violation.
That prosecutors' ethical duties exceed constitutional minimums is
not unique to the administrative suppression context.m7 Prosecutors'
ethical duties to disclose exculpatory evidence exceed Brady v.
Maryland's2 38 constitutional floor.2 39 As a matter of due process, the
government need only disclose material, exculpatory evidence.2 * Yet
the ethical rules require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence
even when not material. 241 Due process does not require disclosure of
235 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 150 (1936).
"6 See supra Part II.
237 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 873, 899 (2012) [hereinafter Professional Regulation]; see also Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 47 n.6 (1991) ("Most commentators fail to recognize
that prosecutors' ethical obligations may differ from their constitutional
responsibilities."); id. at 47 n.7 ("Hence, the [Model] Code [of Professional
Responsibility] secures protections not contemplated by the Constitution." (quoting
United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1988))).
238 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
239 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.11 cmt. (1993);
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 498 (2009)
[hereinafter Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's
Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 328 (2001) [hereinafter Prosecutor's Duty
to Truth]; Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors' Ethical Duty of Disclosure in Memory of Fred
Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 57, 67, 74 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 616 (1999) [hereinafter Seek
Justice]; Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics
2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 app. at 485-86 (2009) (Report to the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct Concerning Rule 3.8
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 909 (1995);
see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
240 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
241 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009);
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evidence that is inadmissible, cumulative, or that the defense can
acquire with reasonable diligence;2 4 2 ethical rules contain no such
limitations.24 3
Moreover, Brady is not the only context in which prosecutors'
ethical duties exceed constitutional minimums. Prosecutors should
present evidence to a grand jury that tends to negate guilt or mitigate
an offense, though due process does not so require.2 44 Prosecutors also
bear an ethical responsibility to help investigate and rectify possible
245 246
wrongful convictions, which due process does not require.
Part A of this section provides background on existing ethical
standards for prosecutors. Part B then explains why the ethical
responsibilities embodied in those standards should be read to create
an ethical duty of administrative suppression.
Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1628-29 (2006); Green, Professional Regulation,
supra note 237, at 884.
242 Gershman, Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 239, at 328.
243 Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2002) ("The prosecutor in a
criminal case shall ... make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense . ... (emphasis added)). Commentators recognize that
prosecutors violate Brady not infrequently. E.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in
Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 401-03 (2007); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch
of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1540 (2010); Eve Brensike Primus, A
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010). The lack of Brady
compliance suggests that prosecutors may be unlikely to embrace administrative
suppression, which would presumably be damaging to prosecutors' chances of
conviction. How to encourage prosecutors to administratively suppress evidence and
whether to sanction violations is addressed below. See infra Part III.B.4.
244 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-3.5(a) (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.6(b) & cmt.
245 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)(2)(ii) (investigate); id. 3.8(h)
(remediate); Kuckes, supra note 227, at 431.
246 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (describing due process
duty to disclose exculpatory or mitigating evidence before trial and ethical duty to
inform others of later-discovered evidence casting doubt on conviction); Douglas H.
Ginsburg & Hyland Hunt, The Prosecutor and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence:
DNA and Beyond?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 771, 780 n.46 (2010) (same); Michele K.
Mulhausen, Comment, A Second Chance at Justice: Why States Should Adopt ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h), 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 309, 320 (2010)
(explaining that wrongful conviction amendments to Model Rule 3.8 impose new
duties on prosecutors).
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A. Background
Prosecutors have a well-recognized ethical duty not merely to seek
convictions but to serve as "minister[s] of justice."" This minister of
justice duty stems from the nature of the prosecutor's client-the
public as a whole."'
Analyzing the minister of justice duty is difficult to do in
isolation,24 9 but it transcends that of an advocate for a private client;
the prosecutor bears "specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice," which "may require a prosecutor to
undertake some procedural and remedial measures as a matter of
obligation" to guard the rights of defendants.5 "Prosecutors have a
247 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); accord
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (prosecutors should ensure that
"justice shall be done"); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (same); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 ("The prosecutor is an independent administrator of
justice. The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice . . . ."); STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) ("The duty of the prosecutor
is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
248 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.2(b)
(2008); Green, Seek Justice, supra note 239, at 625; Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to
Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1127 (2011) [hereinafter ABA's Project] (Summer 2010 Proposed
Prosecution Function Standard 3-1.4); Rory K. Little, "It's Not My Problem?" Wrong:
Prosecutors Have an Important Ethical Role to Play, 7 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 685, 687
(2010) [hereinafter Not My Problem]; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11 ("For though
the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor,
he must always be faithful to his client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be
done."'); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 160
(1969) ("Uncle Sam is not an ordinary client. Uncle Sam always wins when justice is
done. This means he may lose when judgment is entered for him, and he may win
when judgment is entered against him."); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in
Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 77-78 (2011) (public prosecution system meant to
vest public's trust in single prosecutor to act on people's behalf).
249 See R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us
About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice," 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 638
(2006) [hereinafter Character and Context]; Green, Seek Justice, supra note 239, at 618;
Little, Not My Problem, supra note 248, at 688.
250 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1; see also Peter A. Joy, Prosecution
Clinics: Dealing with Professional Role, 74 MISS. L.J. 955, 972 n.59 (2005) ("The ethics
rules assume that procedural justice is a societal goal."); Little, ABA's Project, supra
note 248, at 1143 (Summer 2010 Proposed Prosecution Function Standard 3-4.6)
("The prosecutor's obligation to enforce the law while exercising sound discretion
includes honoring the constitutional and legal rights of suspects, defendants, and
victims."); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 303 (2009) (duty to seek justice "is also quite
commonly understood to mean that prosecutors should 'play by the rules' and should
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duty as 'ministers of justice' to go beyond seeking convictions and
legislatively authorized sentences in individual cases, and to think
about the delivery of criminal justice on a systemic level, promoting
criminal justice policies that further broader societal ends."2 5 1
American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rule 3.8 addresses the
unique duties of prosecutors.252 Relevant to this Article, Rule 3.8
provides, "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause."2 53 By specifying "that the prosecutor knows," Rule
3.8 requires prosecutors to exercise independent judgment.254
Although Rule 3.8(a) addresses only probable cause," the ABA
Prosecutorial Investigation standards reach more broadly.256 The ABA
ensure that defendants are afforded a fair process").
25 See R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to
Support Sentencing Reform, 45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at
103) [hereinafter (Ad)ministering Justice], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2328274.
252 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8. The bulk of the ABA Model Rules
apply to prosecutors just as they do to private attorneys. See Bruce A. Green,
Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1576 [hereinafter Ethics As
Usual]. But prosecutors' duties vary from private counsel's because prosecutors do
different work involving grand juries and warrants, face different procedural rules
regarding disclosure, bear a higher burden of proof, and because the prosecutor must
make many decisions that clients would make in private litigation. Green, Ethics As
Usual, supra, at 1576-77.
253 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (emphasis added).
254 See id. 3.8(a); Recommendation, supra note 212, at 45 (perhaps no principle in
ABA Prosecutorial Investigation Standards is "more critical than the need for the
prosecutor to exercise independent judgment throughout the process"); see also
Gershman, Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 239, at 342 (prosecutors should
approach cases with "healthy skepticism"); Uviller, Neutral Prosecutor, supra note 30,
at 1704 (urging prosecutors to act as "inquisitive neutralls]").
255 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a).
256 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS H§ 1.3(a)(ii),
2.13(b)(i), 2.17(a) (2008); see also NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (Nat'l Dist.
Att'ys Ass'n 2009); Green, Professional Regulation, supra note 237, at 877 (describing
ABA Criminal Justice Standards as meant to provide guidance on broader set of issues
than model rules).
State ethical rules across much of the country follow the ABA Model Rules. Those
state ethical standards provide the basis for professional discipline. The ABA Criminal
Justice Standards, in contrast, are practice guidelines meant "as a guide to professional
conduct and performance" that are not intended to serve as the basis of professional
discipline or civil liability. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-1.1 (1993). Despite their lack of enforceability, the Criminal Justice
Standards provide an important source of guidance for the ethical practice of criminal
law. As of 2009, they had been cited in more than 120 Supreme Court and 700 federal
circuit court opinions, and court rules in several states had adopted them. Martin
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Criminal Justice Standards Committee noted that perhaps no duty in
the Prosecutorial Investigation Standards was "more critical" than that
of the prosecutor to exercise independent judgment. Several
commentators have persuasively argued that this independent
judgment duty requires prosecutors to satisfy themselves that a
defendant is guilty before bringing charges, 2  and the ABA has
proposed incorporating that standard.25 9
Prosecutors' minister of justice duty sometimes diverges sharply
from private counsel's responsibilities even in the courtroom.26 0 For
instance, prosecutors ethically may not discredit a witness through
cross-examination that they know is testifying truthfully.26 1 A criminal
defense attorney, by contrast, is not only permitted but probably
required to seek to discredit adverse testimony even if she knows it to
be truthful.262 Civil counsel need not pull punches in cross-
Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, 23
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10-12; see also Ellen S. Podgor, The Role of the Prosecution
and Defense Function Standards: Stagnant or Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1175
(2011) ("The Standards, however, provide an opportunity to offer hortatory advice
that can improve the legal process." (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, although the
Prosecutorial Investigation Standards "address the investigative stage of the criminal
justice process," STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS
§ 1.1(a), they also apply to prosecutors' charging and case-presenting responsibilities
because decisions made at those later stages significantly impact future investigations.
257 Recommendation, supra note 212, at 45.
258 MONROE H. FRIEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs 292 (4th
ed. 2010); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the
Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993) [hereinafter Moral
Standard]; Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992
B.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 699-700. But see Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, supra note 210,
at 79, 99-100; H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1973). These articles
advocate various thresholds of certainty for prosecutors' charging decision. See
FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra, at 292 (beyond a reasonable doubt); Gershman, Moral
Standard, supra, at 530 (requiring moral certainty); Melilli, supra, at 701 (beyond a
reasonable doubt).
259 Little, ABA's Project, supra note 248, at 1120-21, 1143 (Summer 2010 Proposed
Revisions to Standard 3-4.5).
260 See, e.g., Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice, supra note 239, at 113 (describing
"critical ethical inquiry in [courtroom] context lals whether and how [prosecutors']
zeal should be tempered by the prosecutor's additional obligation as a 'minister of
justice'); Joy, supra note 250, at 979 (contrasting prosecutors' courtroom obligations
with defense attorneys'); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:
A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 224-26 (1988) (rejecting idea that
prosecutor's role becomes purely adversarial at trial).
261 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 6-6.4; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(b); Green, Seek justice, supra note 239, at 632.
262 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.6(b) (1993)
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examination."' Prosecutors must call procedural errors to the court's
attention,'" though private lawyers face no such obligation.2 65
As ministers of justice, prosecutors frequently must refrain from
introducing reliable, probative evidence. 2 66 For instance, prosecutors
should not offer tangible evidence that would advance the pursuit of
truth absent "a reasonable basis" for its admissibility,267 and they
should not bring inadmissible matters to the jury's attention. 68
Because this standard hinges on admissibility269-and not all relevant
evidence is admissible 2m-relevance is necessary but not sufficient for
a prosecutor to ethically seek to introduce evidence. Defense attorneys
are similarly required to refrain from using evidence that they know is
inadmissible, but the Criminal Justice Standards provide that the
prosecutor should exercise "great care" and note that she should
refrain from using reliable, probative evidence "in many instances;" 27'
the Standards lack analogous language for defense attorneys.272
Accordingly, the existing standards already recognize that prosecutors'
minister of justice duty does not amount to simply seeking to
introduce all relevant or probative evidence. All federal prosecutors
have embraced this notion to some extent insofar as the Department of
Justice has declined since 1968 to offer evidence of confessions
obtained in violation of Miranda even though there was statutory
authority for its admissibility and confessions can be highly
probative.27
("Defense counsel's belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not
preclude cross-examination."); id. § 4-7.6 cmt. ("Our interest in not convicting the
innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth." (quoting
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part))); FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 258, at 212-13.
263 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 & cmt. 1 (2002) (duty of diligence
and comment regarding zealous advocacy).
26 See id. 3.8 cmt. 1.
265 Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88
GEo. LJ. 207, 228 & n.115 (2000).
266 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6 cmt. ("It is
obviously not easy to forgo using reliable and probative evidence when it is at hand,
but the prosecutor must do so in many instances.").
267 Id. § 3-5.6(d).
2- Id. § 3-5.6(b).
269 Id. § 3-5.6.
270 See FED. R. EVID. 402.
271 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6 cmt.
272 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.5 cmt. (1993).
273 Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 289-90. Although some illegally-obtained
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Moreover, prosecutors are not ethically permitted to introduce all
probative, admissible evidence. As early as the 1930s, the ABA's
Committee on Professional Ethics explained that prosecutors could
not ethically introduce statements that a defendant made to an
attorney while in police custody obtained using a secret recording
device.2 74 The secret recording was illegal, but the resulting evidence
was nonetheless admissible under Supreme Court precedent. 27 Yet the
fact that the heavily probative recording was admissible had no
bearing on the ABA's conclusion that the prosecutor could not
ethically introduce it.276 Despite some hint from the 1930 ABA
informal opinion, none of the existing ethical standards currently
require administrative suppression. Some standards address only
admissibility of evidence rather than constitutionality of the
underlying searches or seizures,277 while others provide that
prosecutors should prevent police from using illegal means to obtain
evidence but do not urge particular remedial action.
confessions may lack probative value as a result of coercion, other Miranda violations
do not result in questioned reliability.
274 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 150 (1936).
275 Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
276 Id.
277 See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.2 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009); STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (1993). Of course
constitutionality is a subset of admissibility. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
278 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-1.4; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS H§ 1.3(b), 3.5(b) (2008); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-3.1(c) cmt. Proposed changes to the Criminal Justice Standards would
add "improper conduct by law enforcement" as a factor for prosecutors to consider in
the charging decision, which seemingly turns on constitutionality rather than
admissibility, see Little, ABA's Project, supra note 248, at 1143 (Summer 2010
Proposed Revisions to § 3-4.6); Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking
and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1265 (2011)
[hereinafter Prosecutorial Decisionmaking] (2009 Proposed Revisions to § 3-5.6(6)),
but it remains unclear in the proposed provision what prosecutors should do when
they detect improper conduct.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual and the National Prosecution Standards ("NPS") are
exceptions to the lack of specified remedies. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual directs
federal prosecutors not to present evidence to a grand jury that they personally know
was the direct result of a clear constitutional violation. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra
note 91, § 9-11.231; see also NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-3.5(b) (prosecutors
should not present evidence to the grand jury that the prosecutor knows was obtained
illegally by law enforcement); id. § 4-8.2(b) (same). These provisions point in the
right direction, but their reach is too limited insofar as they apply only to grand juries
and require personal knowledge of a violation. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra
note 91, § 9-11.231; see also NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS §§ 3-3.5(b), 4-8.2. The
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To serve their minister of justice duty, prosecutors bear significant
responsibilities to work with and train police officers. In their
interactions with police, a proposed standard would provide that
prosecutors should "maintain respectful yet independent
judgment."27 9 Prosecutors should neither "knowingly use illegal means
to obtain evidence" nor "employ or instruct or encourage others to use
such means."280 Prosecutors should affirmatively "take steps to
promote compliance by law enforcement agents with the relevant legal
rules."2 8 1 To this end, prosecutors should "take the lead in assuring
that investigations of criminal activities are conducted lawfully and in
full and ungrudging accordance with the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights." 8 2 Prosecutors should advise police regarding their legal
obligations28 and train police to perform their duties legally,284
particularly with respect to search and seizure law.285 Whenever
U.S. Attorneys' Manual is also unduly narrow in requiring that the constitutional
violation be "clear." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 91, § 9-11.231.
279 Little, ABA's Project, supra note 248, at 1136 (Summer 2010 Proposed Revisions
to Standard 3-3.2(a)).
280 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1(c); accord
NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-1.4.
281 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.3(b); see
also id. § 1.3(a), (d); Little, ABA's Project, supra note 248, at 1136 (Summer 2010
Proposed Revisions to § 3-3.2(b)) ("The prosecutor's office should strive to keep law
enforcement personnel informed of relevant legal and legal ethics issues and decisions
as they relate to prosecution matters .... ).
282 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1(c) cmt.; accord
id. § 3-1.2 cmt. (prosecutor required "to protect the innocent as well as to convict the
guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the
public"); Jackson, supra note 22, at 6 ("Only by extreme care can we protect the spirit
as well as the letter of our civil liberties, and to do so is a responsibility of the federal
prosecutor."); see also id. at 3 (prosecutor is entrusted to do "the right thing" while
preserving "the best in our American traditions").
283 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.7(a); accord
NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-5.6.
284 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.7(b); accord
NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS §§ 2-5.3, 2-5.4; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.3(d).
285 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-2.3 ("(Pirosecutor's office should assist in
training law enforcement personnel within the prosecutor's jurisdiction on the law
applicable to the issuance and execution of search and arrest warrants."); id. § 2-5
cmt. ("[Tihe prosecutor could educate the police in the area of pre-trial criminal
procedure, including search and seizure law, the arrest process, the use of force, and
interrogation. In particular, with respect to the various exclusionary rules pertaining
to the admissibility of evidence, the prosecutor has a responsibility to educate the
police on the effect of court decisions in general and their application in specific cases
where evidence was suppressed by a trial court."); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.4(b) ("Prosecutors should take reasonable care to ensure
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practicable, prosecutors should review and approve warrant
applications.286
These specific provisions regarding police-prosecutor interactions
point to a broader prosecutorial duty to serve as a constitutional check
on police to protect constituents' rights.28 7 Law-trained prosecutors
understand the intricacies of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as
police officers cannot." Indeed, two commentators have explained
that the Department of Justice views increased involvement by
prosecutors in criminal investigations as a means to avoid improper
that investigators working at their direction or under their authority are adequately
trained in the standards governing the issuance of arrest and search warrants . . . .").
286 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 2.8(d); see
also NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-2.1 ("The prosecutor's office should develop
and maintain a system for providing law enforcement with the opportunity for a
prompt legal review of search and arrest warrant applications before the applications
are submitted to a judicial officer."); id. § 3-2 cmt. ("The standard suggests the
prosecutor's review of warrants and applications for the same, whenever practical.");
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.4 cmt. ("Where there
is no such legal requirement of prosecutorial approval of warrants, prosecutors should
nonetheless require law enforcement officers to obtain prosecutorial approval in close
or difficult cases . . . .").
287 See United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2 cmt. ("Pursuant to the prosecution's duty to seek
justice, the protection of the rights of all (even the [defendant]) is required.");
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1 cmt.; Jackson, supra
note 22, at 6 ("Only by extreme care can we protect the spirit as well as the letter of
our civil liberties, and to do so is a responsibility of the federal prosecutor."); id. at 3
(prosecutor is entrusted to do "the right thing" while preserving "the best in our
American traditions"); see also Re, supra note 72, at 43 (explaining that "local
prosecutors steeped in legal training and attentive to judicial interpretations of
constitutional rights" were responsible for overseeing the professional police force that
evolved during the nineteenth century).
288 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.7 cmt. ("Few
lawyers are as well qualified to [train police on the constitutional limits of their
authorityl as is the prosecutor, who lives with the judicial response to police action on
a day-to-day basis."); William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law,
24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 333, 345 (1991) (empirical study finding that police
officers correctly answered 47.5% of the questions posed about the rules of search and
seizure, while lawyers correctly answered 73% of those questions); see also PA. R.
CRIM. P. 507 cmt. (allowing counties to require "law trained prosecutor" to approve
arrest warrants to exercise "some control over the initiation of the proceedings"
because prosecutor "is in the best position to assess the existence of probable cause"),
available at http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter5/s507.html. But cf.
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 371 [hereinafter Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule]
(criticizing Heffernan and Lovely study for trying to draw conclusions about actual
behavior from laboratory study).
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behavior.289 Prosecutor expertise also explains why some jurisdictions
require prosecutor approval of warrant applications.290 Prosecutors
have, on a broad level, embraced their role as an intrabranch check
insofar as the National Prosecution Standards-adopted by the
National District Attorneys Association-provide that the prosecutor
bears ultimate responsibility for all searches and seizures conducted in
her cases, including scrutinizing the source of all evidence that she
wishes to use. 291 "A prosecutor who knows or who is aware of a
substantial risk that an investigation has been conducted in an
improper manner, or that evidence has been illegally obtained by law
enforcement, must take affirmative steps to investigate and remediate
such problems."292
As I have developed at greater length elsewhere, prosecutors are
public lawyers who should serve their constituencies' interests,29 3 at
least when doing so does not violate other more specific ethical
obligations such as their duty to pursue charges only when supported
by probable cause.294 Because prosecutors cannot simply ask their
entity-clients what objectives they should pursue, prosecutors have to
make these core decisions based on their best understanding of their
constituents' interests. 9 5  Leaving aside any potential balancing
between the two, there is reason to think that American prosecutors'
constituents desire civil liberties and crime control.96
269 Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REv. 381, 459 (2002) [hereinafter Federal Prosecutors' Ethics].
290 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-106.1 (West 2013) (requiring prosecutors to
advise peace officers and review warrant affidavits when asked); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 542.276(2)(8) (West 2013) (requiring prosecutor approval of warrant applications);
PA. R. CRIM. P. 202 (2010) (authorizing counties to require prosecutor approval of
search warrant applications). Pennsylvania counties have widely adopted prosecutor
warrant approval pursuant to Rule 202. See, e.g., Pa. R. Lehigh Cnty. R.C.R.P. 202
(2013); Pa. R. Cumberland Cnty. R.P.R. 2002a.1 (2013); Pa. R. Lycoming Cnty. R.
Crim. P. L2002A (2013).
291 See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-1.3.
292 Id.
293 Gold, supra note 248, at 75-80; see also Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers,
Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41
B.C. L. REv. 789, 792-94 (2000).
294 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2002).
295 Cassidy, (Ad)ministering justice, supra note 9, at 112 ("Because the prosecutor
represents society at large, she has no personal client to direct her course of action,
and must make decisions about what is in the best interests of the sovereign that
ordinarily would be entrusted to a client. This unique role of both principal and agent
requires the prosecutor to pursue the public interest, rather than simply pursue a
conviction.").
296 See Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice, supra note 239, at 115 ("Representing a
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B. Administrative Suppression and Ethical Responsibilities
While ethical standards and scholars have not yet recognized a duty
of administrative suppression, prosecutors' role as agents of their
constituencies provides reason to recognize such a duty. More
specifically, prosecutors' responsibilities to advance their constituents'
interests in rights protection and crime control as well as to bear
ultimate responsibility for evidence used in their cases and act as an
independent intrabranch check on police provide bases for
prosecutors to administratively suppress evidence that they conclude
was unconstitutionally obtained.
Although administrative suppression is not now widespread in
practice, following a report cataloging substantial racial profiling,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") prosecutors in
Charlotte, North Carolina have declined to prosecute deportation
cases when their evidence was obtained through unconstitutional
searches or seizures. 9 7 In immigration hearings the exclusionary rule
does not apply, 98 so the administratively-suppressed evidence was
nonetheless admissible.
Manhattan District Attorney, Cyrus Vance, explained that his office
dismisses cases every day after concluding that a stop was
unconstitutional.29 9 Vance's statement is opaque as to whether it relies
on predicted judicial determinations of admissibility or prosecutors'
constitutionality determinations, but it could be read as embracing
administrative suppression.
1. Constitutional Rights
Imposing consequences on constitutional violations encourages
police to comply with their constitutional requirements, which is the
lone justification the Supreme Court now offers for the judicial
sovereign requires special attention to the public interest broadly conceived, not just
to procedural fairness and accuracy in the litigation of individual cases.").
2 Cade, supra note 1, at 184-86.
29 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (plurality opinion).
299 Daniel Prendergast & Jamie Schram, Manhattan DA Knocks NYPD's Stop-Frisk,
N.Y. POST, Sept. 24, 2013, http://nypost.com/2013/09/24/manhattan-da-rips-nypds-
stop-frisk-will-prosecute-abuse/. It is much less likely that Manhattan prosecutors
would be able to admit evidence obtained from an unconstitutional warrantless frisk
based on exceptions to the exclusionary rule than would the ICE attorneys in North
Carolina, but they could nonetheless make practical use of such evidence to obtain a
plea agreement before or in lieu of a suppression motion, see supra notes 204-216 and
accompanying text, or seek to expand exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
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exclusionary rule.3 00 As agents of a democratic populace, prosecutors
have a responsibility to protect their constituents' constitutional rights
from police intrusion.3 0'
Because prosecutors do not hierarchically control law enforcement
officials, they cannot use direct oversight to ensure that police conduct
investigations lawfully and obtain evidence legally. 302 They can,
however, perform these responsibilities indirectly through deterrence
and advising. Administrative suppression would raise the expected
cost of constitutional violations, which would deter and create greater
incentive for police to consult prosecutors for their expertise.
Prosecutors are already urged to facilitate communication with
police;303 greater communication would enhance prosecutors' role
checking police within the executive branch and promote more
constitutionally-informed citizen-police interactions.
When a prosecutor does not administratively suppress evidence but
rather attempts to introduce unconstitutionally-obtained evidence, she
300 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) ("[W]e have focused on
the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.");
Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House United: How the Post-Warren Court Dismantled
the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 475, 515 (2013) (explaining that Davis
stands for proposition that exclusionary remedy "exists solely to deter police
misconduct"); see also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 53, at 597-606 (explaining that
deterrence was not the original basis for the exclusionary rule).
31 See Jackson, supra note 22, at 6 ("Only by extreme care can we protect the spirit
as well as the letter of our civil liberties, and to do so is a responsibility of the federal
prosecutor."); supra Part III.A.
302 See William Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621, 721 ("Historically, the American police
department has been independent of the prosecutor's office: that is, neither police nor
prosecutor directly gives or takes orders from the other. As a result, the prosecutor ...
is unable to command police officers to conduct their searches within constitutional
bounds."); Caleb Mason, The Police-Prosecutor Relationship and the No-Contact Rule:
Conflicting Incentives After Montejo v. Louisiana and Maryland v. Shatzer, 58 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 747, 769 (2010) ("The prosecutor must supervise investigations, but is not in
a direct chain of command with the enforcement agencies."); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 706 (1970)
(describing the "independent character of most United States prosecutors and police
organizations, neither of which is in a position to bring any direct command influence
on the other"); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation,
and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 780 (1999) ("[Tlhe relationship
between federal investigative agencies and federal prosecutors is coordinate, not
hierarchical."); see also Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 75, at 1626 (criticizing police
and prosecutors for "behav[ing] as though they work for different entities").
303 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-5.1 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009) ("The chief
prosecutor should actively seek to improve communications between his or her office
and other law enforcement agencies.").
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signals to police-and defendants-that prosecutors will overcome
Fourth Amendment violations with clever lawyering. Successfully
introducing unconstitutionally-obtained evidence sends a stronger
signal to police that the Fourth Amendment should not seriously
concern them and to citizens that Fourth Amendment protections are
worth less than they might have thought.30 ' Indeed, in reference to the
silver platter doctrine,30 Mapp explained that "the State, by admitting
evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the
Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold."306 The implicit
message from prosecutors to police is simple: unconstitutionality is
not a problem unless it results in inadmissibility.30 ' More specifically,
only deliberate constitutional violations have costs;30 s that conclusion
undermines the incentive for police caution and the incentive to seek
out prosecutors' expertise.309
3 Although prosecutors have a duty as a minister of justice to do more than seek
convictions, see, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1
(2002); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (1993),
police officers share no such obligation. And even though police officers must comply
with the Fourth Amendment as part of executive enforcement of the Constitution,
they may be less concerned with or aware of the details of these constitutional duties
than law-trained prosecutors. See Mason, supra note 302, at 770 ("[Pirosecutors, as
attorneys, have independent cultural ties and professional obligations that may not
always align with those of police and agents."). ,
305 The "silver platter doctrine" allowed federal prosecutors to present
unconstitutionally-obtained evidence so long as federal officers did not commit the
violation but rather state officers committed the violation and brought the evidence to
federal prosecutors on a silver platter. See MACLIN, supra note 1, at 71-72.
306 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
307 After California passed a ballot initiative eliminating the exclusionary rule for
violations of the State's constitution, police academy manuals and legal sourcebooks
encouraged police to disregard state constitutional prohibitions on certain searches.
See David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
580-81 (2008). Moreover, if an officer has seen a prosecutor successfully introduce
unconstitutionally-obtained evidence more recently than she has seen the prosecutor
fail to do so, she may underperceive the likelihood of judicial suppression because of
the availability heuristic. See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly
Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 276
(Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
30 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
309 See Levinson, supra note 77, at 910-11 (explaining that government officials are
less likely to respect rights not backed by remedies). On the need for prosecutor
action to encourage greater police caution, Ron Wright and Marc Miller found that
New Orleans prosecutors declined to prosecute an "exceptional number of cases,"
which those prosecutors viewed as a necessary step to train police to investigate more
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Prosecutors cannot be meaningfully involved in investigations and
serve as an intrabranch check without a strong incentive for police-
prosecutor communication. Practically, however, police officers can
and do conduct investigations that implicate Fourth Amendment
rights without prosecutors. 3 "o Even though ethical standards
encourage prosecutor approval of warrant applications,"' police can
obtain a warrant without prosecutor approval in most jurisdictions.3 12
Similarly, prosecutors should train and advise police officers,
particularly regarding the Fourth Amendment,3  but police lack
sufficient incentive to seek advice or train attentively.
The costs to police of constitutional violations are low.3 " Few
suppression motions are filed,3 " and fewer still are granted. 3 16 Because
thoroughly. Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 28, at 65.
Declination created a practical remedy for the police deficiencies, which then
encouraged police to correct their mistakes. See id.
31 See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 737 (1999) [hereinafter Proportionality]
("Not all criminal investigative techniques require, or even involve, prosecutors. Law
enforcement agents may and often do, for example, interview witnesses, obtain public
records, and conduct covert surveillance, without ever consulting a prosecutor."); see
also Uviller, Neutral Prosecutor, supra note 30, at 1702 (explaining that most
prosecutions, particularly in state courts, begin with an arrest).
311 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-2.1 cmt. (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 2.8(d) (2008).
312 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528 (West 2013); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
18.04 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-52 (West 2013).
313 NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS §§ 2-5.3, 2-5.4, 3-2.3; id. § 2-5 cmt.; STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.3(d); STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.7(b) & cmt. (1993). The good-faith
exception relies on the notion of a "reasonably well trained officer." Leon, 468 U.S. at
923; see also Logan, supra note 178, at 106 (arguing that courts should create an
incentive for police departments to expand and enhance the quality of training).
314 Similarly, before Mapp incorporated the exclusionary rule, police officers had
little incentive to comply with the Fourth Amendment because there was no risk of
lost evidence. See MACLIN, supra note 1, at 84-85 ("INleither the [Los Angeles] district
attorney's office nor the Los Angeles Police Department 'paid any attention' to Fourth
Amendment rules until the exclusionary rule was applied to the states." (quotation
omitted)); Sidney D. Zion, Detectives Get a Course in Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1965,
at 50 (high-ranking New York police officer: "evidence obtained without a warrant-
illegally if you will-was admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why bother?").
" See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 595 tbl.2 (1983) (motions to suppress
physical evidence filed in only 4.6% of cases). This empirical data is neither recent nor
a representative sample, id. at 606, but given the increasing prevalence of early guilty
pleas a recent statistic may be even lower.
316 Id. at 596 (motions to exclude physical evidence have 16.9% success rate).
Given the frequency of filing and success rate, motions to suppress physical evidence
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of the good-faith exception, admissibility is nearly guaranteed in the
warrant context absent fraud by the affiant, 17 and some deference
exists too outside the warrant context.31 Moreover, judges are inclined
to deny suppression motions because people who file them are guilty
and have typically been caught with contraband.3 19 Under the status
quo, prosecutors and police officers can operate in separate spheres,320
but this insular model does not comport with prosecutors' intrabranch
checking role.2
Important or high-profile cases are the exception to the lack of
incentive for police caution because the expected short-term cost of
suppression in bad publicity or in allowing a dangerous criminal to go
free is so high that a fairly risk-neutral officer would be cautious of
suppression despite its low probability.322
succeeded in only 0.69% of cases according to Nardulli's study. Id. at 598 tbl.8; see
also RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 57 (1984) (finding that suppression motion success
ranged from only 0-2% in six out of seven jurisdictions studied); Albert W. Alschuler,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1375
(2008) (citing studies showing that federal courts excluded unlawfully-seized
evidence in only 1.3% of all federal criminal cases and 0.7% of the state court cases).
Because Herring and Davis narrowed the exclusionary rule significantly over the past
few years, see MACLIN, supra note 1, at 336-44, current numbers are likely lower still.
317 See Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the
Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 225 (2010) [hereinafter Over-Deterrence Hypothesisl; John
E. Taylor, Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good Faith Under United
States v. Leon, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 155, 166 (2005); Elizabeth Canter, Note, A Fourth
Amendment Metamorphosis: How Fourth Amendment Remedies and Regulations
Facilitated the Expansion of the Threshold Inquiry, 95 VA. L. REV. 155, 179-81 (2009);
Rosemarie A. Lynskey, Note, A Middle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Remedy:
Reconciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 VAND. L. REV. 811,
830-34 (1988).
318 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.3(h) at 146 n.227 (5th ed. 2012) (Davis omits "attenuation," the most
significant limitation on Herring's holding that negligent conduct does not warrant
suppression); MACLIN, supra note 1, at 336-44 (describing broad understanding of
Herring and Davis's good-faith exceptions outside warrant context); Slobogin, Is It on
Its Way Out?, supra note 8, at 342 (reading Herring and Davis to suggest that Court is
ready to apply good-faith exception more broadly to warrantless intrusions).
319 See Amar, supra note 172, at 799; Baradaran, supra note 208, at 39; Randy E.
Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive
Principles ofJustice, 32 EMORY LJ. 937, 959-66 (1983); Jacobi, supra note 51, at 656-
60; Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 288, at 403;
Stuntz, supra note 51, at 912-13.
320 See Little, Proportionality, supra note 310, at 737.
321 See supra notes 283-286 and accompanying text.
322 See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
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Administrative suppression would increase the likelihood of
"suppression-in-fact."32 3  Administrative suppression would also
provide greater incentive for prosecutors to inform police of
administrative suppression decisions.324 Greater officer awareness
would in turn raise police officers' perception of the expected cost of a
violation.
When prosecutors inform police officers of their decisions to
administratively suppress evidence, those conversations will also affect
officers' perceptions of the probability of suppression-in-fact by
increasing salience and observed frequency.3 This conclusion builds
on the behavioral economics notion that the perceived probability of
certain events are skewed based on the ease with which an instance
comes to the decisionmaker's mind. If prosecutors confront police
officers to inform them of administrative suppression decisions, those
discussions would increase the vividness of suppression-in-fact, much
like the behavioral economics example of printing parking tickets on
brightly-colored paper.327 Moreover, those discussions following
administrative suppression would occur much closer in time to the
violations than would conversations following a successful judicial
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 85-86 (1992)
(describing police officers' greater interest in obtaining a conviction in "serious" or
"big" cases and finding that this heightened interest increases Fourth Amendment
compliance in such cases); see also id. at 89 (explaining that 24% of judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders polled thought that officers did not care when
evidence was suppressed in a small case).
32 See Miller & Wright, Black Box, supra note 2, at 138 ("executive exclusion"
occurred far more frequently than judicial suppression in data set). That number
would be larger still if it encompassed searches or seizures that prosecutors concluded
were unconstitutional but nonetheless generated admissible evidence because of
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
"Suppression-in-fact" encompasses both judicial suppression and administrative
suppression.
324 Prosecutors have a "responsibility to educate the police on the effect of court
decisions ... where evidence was suppressed." NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 2-5
cmt. (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009); accord STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.7 cmt. (1993); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.3(d) (2008) (prosecutor should assist in providing
training to police concerning best practices in criminal investigations); STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.7(b) (prosecutor should provide
services to train police to comply with the law).
325 Jolls, supra note 307, at 271, 277 (discussing availability heuristic and
importance of salience).
326 Id.
327 Id. at 276-77.
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suppression motion.3" Accordingly, administrative suppression would
raise the salience and observed frequency of suppression-in-fact to a
point that police would likely perceive a non-negligible expected cost
of a constitutional violation even in an ordinary case.
And there is reason to think that police officers would alter their
behavior to account for prosecutors' future uses of evidence. Caleb
Mason argues that prosecutors should announce and follow a policy of
not using statements obtained from represented defendants to adhere
to prosecutorial ethical requirements even though police could
constitutionally elicit such statements.2 Police, he contends, will
respond to such a policy by no longer seeking to elicit such statements
because they know that the statements will be useless.3 Jack Chin
recently suggested that to achieve an important policy objective of
rooting out racial profiling in criminal justice prosecutors should
refrain from using admissible evidence obtained by a stop or
investigation in which the officer pursued a suspect based on race.
ICE prosecutors in North Carolina have done as Chin advocates,
systematically closing deportation proceedings in cases arising in
Alamance County after a DOJ report found significant evidence of
racial profiling in that county's search and seizure practices.3 32 Several
other commentators have recognized that police decide whether to
arrest a suspect based on whether they think prosecutors will likely
pursue the charges, which also supports the notion that police alter
their behavior to account for prosecutors' anticipated behavior. There
is also good reason to think that consulting prosecutors whenever
practicable before an encounter implicating the Fourth Amendment
would reduce the likelihood of lost evidence. 3 34 The ex ante approval
328 See Christopher Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure Cases 16 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 13-21, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2247746 ("IBlecause exclusion, on those rare occasions when it does occur, is often
announced well after the search or seizure or the suppression hearing, it may not
provide much of a lesson to the miscreant officer.").
329 Mason, supra note 302, at 779-80.
330 Id.
331 Jack Chin, Obama's and Holder's Objections to Profiling: Just Empty BS,
PRAWFSBLAWG (July 23, 2013, 4:46 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg
2013/07/obamas-and-holders-objections-to-profiling-just-empty-bs.html.
332 Cade, supra note 1, at 184-85.
3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES
AND COMMENTARY 861 (9th ed. 2010); Fairfax, supra note 196, at 1266 n.91; Joseph
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration ofJustice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 575 n.67 (1960).
3 See Green & Zacharias, Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, supra note 289, at 459.
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of one prosecutor will increase the likelihood of ex post approval by
the prosecutor who analyzes administrative suppression.1 5 Although
this Article does not advocate deference by one prosecutor to another's
ex ante approval, confirmation bias and selective information
processing might result in a form of de facto deference." 6
Administrative suppression will also serve as a sort of pre-
commitment device for prosecutors to encourage themselves to train
police regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment right rather than
merely its judicial remedy. Under the status quo, some prosecutors
focus training on judicial admissibility because the practical costs of
police decisionmaking hinge on this more generous admissibility
standard. But training geared toward judicial remedy fails to
properly encourage police to protect the full scope of Fourth
Amendment rights. And police officers, as members of the executive
branch, must respect the broader constitutionality standard .33  Their
responsibilities are not limited by judicial remedies doctrine.339
Administrative suppression will also provide a pre-commitment to
greater prosecutor care when reviewing warrant applications. At
present, if a warrant application is denied, the police (and prosecutor)
can simply come back with a slightly revised application and try
again.o This possibility for a second bite at the apple undermines the
incentive for careful scrutiny in the first instance. If a magistrate issues
a warrant, admissibility is essentially guaranteed.3 1 As a matter of time
3 See Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress
and "Lost Cases": The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1065-66 (1991) (exclusionary rule provides incentive to have
prosecutors review warrants).
336 MEDWED, supra note 210, at 128 (describing power of "conformity effects"
leading people to come to same conclusions as peers); see Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, supra note 239, at 494-96.
3' Dripps, Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, supra note 317, at 238; Donald Dripps,
Living with Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 946 (1986) ("[Wle can count on police
bureaucracies to train and reward their officers with an eye to admissible evidence and
not to abstract legality."); see also LaFave, supra note 176, at 359 (police "are no less
likely than the rest of us to equate admissibility with legality"); Sklansky, supra note
307, at 580-81 (after California eliminated judicial exclusionary rule as matter of state
law, police academy manuals and sourcebooks encouraged officers to disregard non-
judicially-enforced rights).
33 See supra Parts 1-I.
33 Id.
340 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 974 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(" [EIven when the police know their warrant application is probably insufficient, they
retain an incentive to submit it to a magistrate, on the chance that he may take the
bait.").
3' See supra notes 317-319 and accompanying text.
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efficiency, police and prosecutors have an incentive to see how little
they can get away with. If a prosecutor reviewing a warrant application
anticipated the possibility of administrative suppression, she would
exercise greater care because Leon would not save an insufficiently-
supported warrant unless it cleared the administrative suppression
hurdle first.
Anecdotal evidence from California confirms that increased
suppression-in-fact facilitates police-prosecutor communication and
training."' As Governor Brown explained, California's adoption of the
judicial exclusionary rule resulted in "much greater education" of
police and more police-prosecutor cooperation."
Administrative suppression is likely to raise the expected cost of a
constitutional violation, which would facilitate more frequent police-
prosecutor communication. For these reasons, prosecutors should
administratively suppress evidence that they believe was
unconstitutionally obtained to promote their constituencies' interests
in rights protection. Administrative suppression is also likely to
encourage prosecutors to confront police about constitutional
violations and exercise greater care in warrant application review.
2. Crime Control
Although it seems fairly intuitive that administrative suppression
would protect constitutional rights, it is perhaps far less intuitive that
administrative suppression would also advance crime control efforts.
The Supreme Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence assumes the
contrary about judicial suppression.
As ministers of justice, prosecutors are charged not only with
seeking convictions but with ensuring that guilt is adjudicated
through fair procedures.4 The procedural justice model of policing
developed by Schulhofer, Tyler, and Huq provides an important
reason why, as a practical matter, ensuring fair treatment for
defendants is important. 346
342 See Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Attorney Gen. of Cal., to Stanford Law
Review (Dec. 7, 1956) (quoted in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220-21
(1960)).
3' Id.
31 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (contending that the
exclusionary rule exacts "a costly toll upon ... law enforcement objectives").
34 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002).
34 Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 345-49.
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The procedural justice model of policing relies on empirical work
demonstrating that citizens' compliance with the law and with law
enforcement is dictated primarily by the extent to which they perceive
their law enforcement agencies as legitimate rather than by
instrumental factors such as threat of force or fear of consequences.
This perception of police legitimacy depends primarily on whether
those who interact with the police view their treatment as fair."4 " For
instance, because racial profiling is seen as unfair, if members of a
community perceive profiling to be widespread they will be less
supportive of and cooperative with the police.349 It seems not terribly
controversial that "[tlo be effective in lowering crime and creating
secure communities, the police must be able to elicit cooperation from
community residents. "350
In the Fourth Amendment context, Schulhofer, Tyler, and Huq
rightly recognize that maintaining respect for the law was one of the
3 Id. at 338, 363; see Tom R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 57 (2002)
(concluding based on empirical studies in Chicago and California that "people are
significantly more focused on the procedural justice of authorities' actions than ... the
favorability or fairness of their own outcomes" during police or judicial encounters);
TYLER, supra note 16, at 161 (concluding based on empirical study "that legitimacy
plays an important role in promoting compliance" with the law); Sunshine & Tyler,
supra note 16, at 529 (finding that perceptions of police legitimacy had stronger
correlation to citizen cooperation with police than did citizens' evaluation of risk); id.
at 534 ("People are not primarily instrumental in their reactions to the police . . . .");
Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 262-63 (2008)
(concluding based on New York study that "legitimacy shapes willingness to
cooperate with the police in fighting crime" and that while instrumental approaches
such as creating a credible threat of punishment have some potential value, "the
influence of instrumental calculations on behavior is, at best, small"); see also Tyler &
Fagan, supra, at 267 ("Cooperation increases ... when citizens see the police as
legitimate authorities who are entitled to be obeyed. Such legitimacy judgments, in
turn, are shaped by public views about procedural justice-the fairness of the
processes the police use when dealing with members of the public.").
3 TYLER, supra note 16, at 162 (explaining that views about legitimacy of
authority "are strongly connected to judgments of the fairness of the procedures
through which authorities make decisions"); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 16, at 526
(reporting results of study concluding that procedural justice had a much stronger
impact on police legitimacy than did performance evaluations or distributive justice
judgments and was not based at all on citizens' estimates of risk of punishment); Tyler
& Fagan, supra note 347, at 264-65.
1 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 347, at 265 & nn.86-87; Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J.
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and
Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 259, 262, 276 (2004).
350 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 347, at 233; see also Sunshine & Tyler, supra note
16, at 518.
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original bases for the judicial exclusionary rule. 5 Justice Brandeis
wrote that the judicial exclusionary rule was essential to preventing
the government from "becom[ing] a lawbreaker," which "breeds
contempt for law." 5 ' Even if police violate a citizen's rights, Justice
Brennan explained, the judicial exclusionary rule would "assur[e] the
people ... that the government would not profit from its lawless
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular
trust in government." 353
Schulhofer, Tyler, and Huq recognize that the Supreme Court's
current exclusionary rule jurisprudence relies on the opposite premise
from that of Justices Brandeis and Brennan. The Court now assumes
that courts suppressing relevant evidence will promote lawlessness by
reducing the likelihood of criminals facing consequences for their
illegal behavior.5 It then balances the lost value of crime deterrence
attendant to lost evidence against deterrence of police misconduct.355
In a recent, prominent example of the procedural justice theory's
import on crime control, a Vera Institute study concluded that
individuals in New York City's most highly patrolled neighborhoods
are eight percent less likely to report a crime to police for each
additional time they have been subjected to the City's notorious stop
and frisk practice.35 6 Even crime victims-not merely bystanders-are
less likely to report crimes if they have been stopped and frisked.
351 Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 361-62.
352 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998)
(excluding evidence "allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the
consequences of their actions").
3 Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 362.
356 JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND
FRISK: EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 70-73 (2013)
[hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/
resources/downloads/stop-and-frisk-technical-report-v4.pdf; see Michael Jacobson,
Foreword to FRATELLO ET AL., TECHNICAL REPORT, supra, at 6 ("The findings of this
study-most significantly, that the City's practice of stop and frisk has unintended
adverse consequences resulting in a lack of trust in police and a clear unwillingness to
report crimes and provide information to law enforcement-is a starting place for
rebuilding trust between those communities and law enforcement."); see also JENNIFER
FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND FRISK:
EXPERIENCES, SELF-PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2013) [hereinafter
SUMMARY REPORT], available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/
downloads/stop-and-frisk-summary-report-v2.pdf.
35 JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 356, at 2, 6-7.
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It might seem unusual that prosecutors would be ethically required
to refrain from using evidence as to which a court would conclude
that the deterrent effect on police behavior was not sufficiently
weighty to justify judicial suppression, but this divergence makes
sense."' Separation of powers and prosecutors' ethical responsibilities
play an important role here. In short, judicial suppression and
administrative suppression pose different queries."' Administrative
suppression imposes a lower cost than judicial suppression because it
does not impact judicial legitimacy, and it also confers greater benefit.
On the cost side, when considering the cost of judicial suppression
to determine whether to create an exception to the judicial
exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court analyzes this question through
the lens of the fragmentary conception of government including a
limited judicial role for Fourth Amendment enforcement.3 60 The
Court's decisions on this topic are tinged with concern about
preserving separation of powers, allowing the executive branch to
police itself, and preserving institutional legitimacy. 361 Under the
fragmentary conception, the executive branch-not the judiciary-is
tasked with primary Fourth Amendment enforcement. Judicial
suppression is a last resort. When it is the prosecutor rather than the
court who prevents the use of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence,
that decision does not impact judicial legitimacy. Accordingly,
administrative suppression does not impose the same cost as judicial
suppression.
Perhaps some readers instinctively think that allowing criminals to
escape conviction in the interest of teaching police a lesson does not
genuinely square with prosecutors' ethical responsibility to do
justice." Collateral proceedings against the officer that do not
undermine a possible conviction may seem preferable. The procedural
justice model of policing plays an important role here to explain why
358 This discussion addresses the substantive overlap between the current
exclusionary rule doctrine and ethical requirements. The broader notion that
prosecutors should refrain from conduct that courts would permit is addressed above.
See supra notes 260-265 and accompanying text.
3 This Article takes as given the Supreme Court's conclusion that current judicial
exclusionary rule doctrine best serves crime control. But see Schulhofer et al., supra
note 15, at 362-63.
60 See supra Parts 1-Il.
361 See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
362 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) ("The principal cost
of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go
free-something that offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system." (internal
quotations omitted)).
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existing ethical standards provide that prosecutors-as representatives
of the public as a whole3 63-should ensure that defendants are
afforded fair process."* Citizens convicted based on the fruits of a
constitutional violation-and their peers-will think their treatment
unfair and their government's action illegitimate even if the officer is
administratively reprimanded and they are financially compensated.36 '
These perceptions will erode police legitimacy and detract from citizen
cooperation.3 66 Rather, under the procedural justice theory, enforcing
constitutional requirements against police instead of profiting from
their violations is likely to support rather than suppress crime
control. 67 Treating defendants fairly bolsters the legitimacy of the
criminal law enforcement apparatus, which in turn serves the public's
objective in crime control and increases citizens' willingness to
cooperate with law enforcement.368
These procedural justice concerns have not prompted the Supreme
Court to reinvigorate the judicial exclusionary rule, 3 6' but they apply
with greater force to administrative suppression. Consider a
generalized instance of administrative suppression: a prosecutor
refrains from using evidence that she believes was obtained
363 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1.2(b)
(2008); Green, Seek Justice, supra note 239, at 625; see also Gold, supra note 248, at
77-78 (public prosecution system meant to vest public's trust in single prosecutor to
act on people's behalf).
* See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961)
("Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws . . . ."); Sundby, supra note 115, at 399 ("The exclusionary rule's command,
therefore, is simply an expression of the first principle of constitutional government:
when accusing a citizen of a crime, government actors themselves must abide by the
law and cannot resort to evidence they have obtained outside the bounds of the
Constitution.").
365 Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 363 (" [Openly exploit[ing officials' unlawful
conduct] to prosecutorial advantage in court [I is the kind of behavior that, the
research establishes, tends to weaken perceived legitimacy and willingness to
cooperate with law enforcement.").
366 Id.
367 Id.
3 In some respects, the idea of refraining from bringing some possible charges
based on unconstitutionally-obtained evidence to promote crime control is similar to
Mike Cassidy's argument that in broadly serving the public interest prosecutors
should support repeal of mandatory minimum sentences because they detract from
public safety. Cassidy, (Ad)ministering justice, supra note 296, at 117-119.
369 See Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 363 ("IRelaxation of the exclusionary
rule represents a direct assault on the capacity of our law enforcement system to
succeed in its mission of maintaining social order.").
2014] 1655
University of California, Davis
unconstitutionally and announces that decision to the defendant or
her counsel. In such an instance, although the police violated a
citizen's rights, the government does not then try to profit from that
violation. Instead, the government admits its violation to the victim
at the outset and brings no criminal charges as a result. In the
administrative suppression context, the prosecutor-who the
defendant may associate with the police as enforcement officials-
could acknowledge the violation early in any potential proceeding and
decline to charge the case altogether. In contrast, a prosecutor who
seeks to exploit a constitutional violation but is prevented from doing
so by the courts leaves the defendant in jeopardy and exposed to the
stigma of criminal charges before the court ultimately intervenes. And
if a defendant feels pressured to take an early guilty plea without filing
a suppression motion, the opportunity for the court to prevent the
government from exploiting its misconduct may never arise.
Therefore, administrative suppression would promote crime control
by enhancing the public legitimacy of criminal law enforcement and
would do so more effectively than judicial suppression.
On the benefit side of the Court's current judicial exclusionary rule
calculus, there are also reasons to think that administrative
suppression would better deter constitutional violations than judicial
suppression does. First and second, administrative suppression would
increase salience and frequency of suppression in fact. 3"
Third, police and prosecutors have a historically close
relationship. Police could discount a judicial suppression ruling as
an aberration or the act of a soft-on-crime judge. But when the
suppression decision comes from a prosecutor with whom the officer
works closely and who is no friend to criminals, the officer might take
this decision more seriously and seek to prevent a recurrence. The
nature of the relationship likely explains in part Dallin Oaks's
370 See id. (explaining that citizens' belief that authorities are legitimate and "abide
by the law" is undermined by "[official disregard for the law-made evident when
misconduct can be openly exploited to prosecutorial advantage in court").
" These two points are discussed in greater detail above. See supra notes 325-328
and accompanying text.
371 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L.
REV. 837, 863 ("Prosecutors ordinarily are naturally aligned with the police . . . ."); id.
at 863 n.95 ("At a minimum, prosecutors and police officers deal with each other
professionally on a daily basis, and must treat each other as colleagues. They may
become friends, and identify, with their counterparts."); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 203 (2d ed. 1975) (suggesting that prosecutors likely have
enough credibility with law enforcement officers to convey importance of truth
telling).
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observation that Toronto police officers took very seriously a limited
form of administrative suppression and sought to modify their
conduct in response."
Lastly, administrative suppression would more effectively debias
police decisionmaking than would judicial suppression. Fourth
Amendment questions are highly fact bound, and prosecutors will
necessarily have to interview the officers involved to develop a
detailed factual record on which to analyze administrative
suppression. 7 ' Those interviews should occur under oath to add
reliability to the fact gathering. Of course, simply moving an officer's
sworn testimony from the courtroom to a meeting with a prosecutor
does not eliminate the possibility of "testilying,"" but it would likely
improve veracity over an unsworn interview.7 Moreover, prosecutors
are more likely than courts to be able to detect lying from officers
because of their repeat exposure to the same officers and perhaps the
same fake stories." If prosecutors detect a lie in an officer's story and
then prevent the officer from testifying falsely in a public judicial
proceeding, they would prevent a loss of police credibility in the
public eye-a major cost of testilying.m Prosecutors should also
consider any factual information or legal arguments that defense
attorneys raise in a proffer when determining the constitutionality of
373 Oaks, supra note 302, at 706. It is, however, worth noting that the relationship
between Canadian prosecutors and police is different than in the United States and
that Oaks's article is now quite dated. Id. As Oaks described it, Canadian prosecutors
are part of the Ministry of Justice that has authority over police organizations. Id.
Although no such direct supervision exists in the United States, see supra note 302,
police and prosecutors maintain a close relationship, see supra note 372, and it seems
that American police would react similarly to what Oaks describes.
3 See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-1.3 (Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n 2009)
(prosecutors have responsibility to investigate suspicions that evidence was obtained
illegally).
375 Instead of potentially lying under oath to protect evidence, see David N.
Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 457
(1999); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1042-43 (1996) [hereinafter Testilying], police officers might
instead lie to the prosecutor.
376 There is a risk that administrative suppression, particularly with questioning
under oath, would undermine the closeness of the police-prosecutor relationship by
positioning the prosecutor as a potential adversary to police rather than a confidante.
But Oaks's article provides reason to think that this strain on police-prosecutor
relations would be outweighed by the beneficial impact of administrative suppression
on police decisionmaking. See Oaks, supra note 302, at 706.
3n Gary C. Williams, Incubating Monsters?: Prosecutorial Responsibility for the
Rampart Scandal, 34 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 829, 836-37 (2001).
" See Slobogin, Testilying, supra note 375, at 1039.
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the searches or seizures in the case. Additional information from
defense counsel may help combat prosecutors' potential tendency
toward partisanship that behavioral psychology suggests is already
especially pronounced when facts or law are unclear as they may be
after an initial factual interview. 79 Defense attorneys might think that
notifying the prosecutor in advance of a viable Fourth Amendment
suppression issue would be the worst possible tactic, especially
considering fears that officers might change their testimony to cover
any problems. But the benefit of alerting the prosecutor in advance
would be adding adversarial perspective to Fourth Amendment
inquiries in the administrative system of criminal justice, and it might
prevent the defendant from having to remain under a shroud of
criminal charges until the motion is resolved.8 o
Social science literature on debiasing, accountability, and
deliberation suggests that forcing officers to articulate their reasoning
and confronting them with adverse reasoning will combat biases and
lead to more rational decisionmaking.38 1 Prosecutors interviewing
police officers will accomplish this objective, and to the extent that
prosecutors can approach interviews with information gleaned from
defense counsel, they can confront officers with adverse reasoning.
Moreover, officers who anticipate having to justify their decisions will
also make more rational and less biased decisions. Much as officers
are forced to internalize the magistrate's neutrality in the warrant
context,3 m3 officers will anticipate and internalize prosecutor neutrality
if they come to expect that prosecutors will neutrally evaluate the
constitutionality of their searches and seizures .3 4 Although the same
3 Perlman, supra note 213, at 26-27.
380 This approach presents an alternative to the binary of facing significant jail time
until the case can be resolved or pleading guilty. See supra notes 215-227 and
accompanying text.
381 Oren Bar-Gill and Barry Friedman have persuasively called for reinvigorating
the warrant requirement based on application of these social science concepts to
police decisionmaking regarding searches and seizures. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra
note 75, at 1642-47.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 1641 (citing Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989)).
3" Admittedly, the benefits of requiring officers to justify their actions to
prosecutors ex post are less significant than requiring officers to articulate their
reasoning ex ante to obtain a warrant because prosecutors and police will suffer from
the same cognitive biases that currently impact judicial suppression decisions. See id.
at 1647. Nonetheless, accountability theory provides reason to think that officers
might act more responsibly because they anticipate having to justify their conduct. See
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results might theoretically follow from anticipating a judicial
suppression hearing, the infrequency of judicial suppression hearings
and officers' knowledge of that infrequency significantly undermine
any potential debiasing effect they might otherwise have. Accordingly,
administrative suppression would have a better debiasing effect on
police decisionmaking than judicial suppression does.
In sum, administrative suppression imposes lower costs to
institutional legitimacy than judicial suppression does and generates
greater benefits. It therefore makes sense that a prosecutor would be
required to administratively suppress evidence even when a court
would conclude that the costs of judicial suppression outweigh its
benefits.
There may be a few rare instances of particularly dangerous
criminals where the short-term interest in crime control would
counsel against administrative suppression when administrative
suppression would mean dropping the case because the need for
incapacitation is so important. 85 This scenario will be exceedingly
rare, however, considering that Fourth Amendment issues arise most
frequently in drug cases.386
Even though a pure act utilitarian approach might seem to counsel
in favor of a dangerous-criminal exception in these exceedingly rare
cases because the short-term danger to public safety would seem to
outweigh countervailing long-term safety and constitutional rights
concerns, such an exception risks swallowing the rule of
administrative suppression. Prosecutors might reasonably estimate
that turning a dangerous criminal loose on what seems like a
technicality could badly tarnish their reputations (or their boss's
reputations) and chances of electoral success, particularly if the
criminal reoffends. Moreover, because the cost would be so great
regardless of the probability, prosecutors would rationally be
extremely averse to this risk.388 District attorney elections are typically
id. at 1644, 1647.
385 See Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice, supra note 296, at 119 ("Prosecutors should
consider public safety their highest priority."); Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 363-
64 (distinguishing between short-term and long-term crime control benefits in
exclusionary rule context).
386 Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (2001).
387 Electoral success is of course much less of a concern in the federal system or in
jurisdictions where lead prosecutors are appointed, but there is ultimately some
democratic accountability even in these contexts.
388 See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Book Review, 1981 DUKE LJ. 878, 885 n.44 (1981)
("[lIndividuals can be highly risk-averse to the chance of large losses, even though the
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banal affairs in which little of substance reaches the public eye, but a
prosecutor dropping charges because of a police error against a
dangerous criminal who reoffends would tend to dominate the
discourse.38 9 The ensuing television ads might outstrip the infamous
Willie Horton ad because in such a hypothetical case the prosecution
would have dropped charges instead of merely permitting a
furlough. 39 0 In contrast, the detriment to constitutional rights or long-
term crime control efforts in such a case that cuts in favor of
administrative suppression would be far less salient with voters.
Accordingly, if prosecutors were afforded discretion in individual
cases to decide whether the risk to public safety is worth
administratively suppressing evidence, risk aversion would likely
make the exception swallow the rule except in the most benign
circumstances.
3. Scope of Ethical Duty
The ethical basis for administrative suppression imposes a broader
standard on administrative suppression of derivative evidence than the
constitutional one. 39' Ethically, prosecutors should administratively
suppress all fruits of what they determine to be an unlawful search or
seizure using the but-for test rather than the more protracted fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine. 39 2 Any use of illegally-obtained evidence
probability of occurrence is slight . . . ."); P. Goran T. Haag, The Economics of Trust,
Trust-Sensitive Contracts, and Regulation, 14 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 437, 443 n.18
(1994) ("[People tend to be more risk averse towards large losses with small
probabilities than minor losses with larger probabilities."). Indeed, the insurance
industry can exist only because people are averse to large losses even when the
probability of those losses is low. Empirical work has concluded that police officers
care about Fourth Amendment compliance much more when cases are "serious" or
"big," Orfield, supra note 322, at 85-86, 89, and the reasoning for prosecutors here
seems similar.
389 See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009) ("District attorneys' electoral contests are rarely
measured assessments of a prosecutor's overall performance. At best, campaign issues
boil down to boasts about conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a
scandal."); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
581, 582-83 (2009) ("[Sitatements [in the typical prosecutor election campaign] dwell
on outcomes in a few high visibility cases .... ).
390 See Laura Sullivan, Shrinking State Budgets May Spring Some Inmates, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 31, 2009, 12:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=102536945.
31 See supra Part II.B.
392 But cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (rejecting but-
for test as constitutional standard).
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both undermines constitutional rights and jeopardizes the perception
of legitimacy of the criminal justice system, which in turn undermines
crime control.3 93 Moreover, using illegally-obtained evidence will not
sufficiently encourage police to consult prosecutors so that they may
serve as an effective intrabranch check. Lastly, embracing the but-for
standard simplifies prosecutors' administrative suppression analysis.
The ethical duty of administrative suppression encompasses all
fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures. It does not give way to
attenuation or any of the other "inclusionary rules" 3  such as the
Fourth Amendment standing doctrine.3 95 Even this broader but-for
standard, however, would permit prosecutors to use evidence obtained
from a source independent of the violation because such evidence is
not in fact a fruit of the unconstitutional search.396 In sum, whether
prosecutors are ethically required to administratively suppress
evidence should be governed by the but-for test without judicial
exclusionary rule exceptions.
4. Implementation and Enforcement
The duty of administrative suppression should be incorporated into
ethical standards, prosecutors' manuals, and disciplinary rules.
For example, administrative suppression should be incorporated
into the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Prosecutorial
Investigation. 397  These standards already include a provision
discussing prosecutors' obligations to limit the taint of illegally-
obtained evidence," but that section could be amended to direct
prosecutors to inquire as to the constitutionality rather than the
3 See Schulhofer et al., supra note 15, at 362-63.
3 See Steiker, supra note 9, at 2466, 2469, 2504.
3 As others have recognized in the context of the judicial exclusionary rule, the
standing requirement impedes deterrence of police misconduct. Daniel J. Meltzer,
Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 CoLuM. L. REV. 247, 275-78 (1988);
Kamisar, supra note 53, at 634-35; Steiker, supra note 9, at 2505.
396 See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
31 The ABA Criminal Justice Standards provide an important benchmark for
ethical conduct of prosecutors. Marcus, supra note 256, at 12; see also supra note 256.
39 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 3.5(b) (2008).
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admissibility of evidence in their cases3 99 and to direct them to refrain
from using evidence that is the fruit of an unconstitutional search. 0
Similarly, prosecutors' manuals, such as the U.S. Attorneys' Manual
should also recognize the duty of administrative suppression.
Although the U.S. Attorneys' Manual already recognizes that
prosecutors should refrain from using evidence before a grand jury
that the prosecutor personally knows was the direct result of a clear
constitutional violation," the duty of administrative suppression is
broader. Administrative suppression applies at all stages of a
prosecution, not solely before the grand jury. Administrative
suppression would also not require a clear constitutional violation.
Even with an addition to prosecutors' manuals, whether prosecutors in
fact make administrative suppression decisions will likely rely on
whether chief prosecutors embrace the proposal and attempt to instill
it as part of office culture.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to exhaustively
address how to enforce this duty of administrative suppression, some
preliminary thoughts are in order. Model Rule 3.8 that addresses the
specific duties of prosecutors should also incorporate the duty of
administrative suppression, and states should follow the ABA's lead as
they often do.404 Unlike the Criminal Justice Standards, the state
ethical rules provide the basis for professional discipline. Once added
to state ethical rules, a prosecutor's failure to consider the
constitutionality standard or to act on her conclusions regarding
constitutionality should warrant professional discipline. As explained
above, there is reason to think that prosecutors would be reluctant to
administratively suppress evidence that meant dropping charges
' The existing standard is tied to admissibility rather than unconstitutionality; it
asks the prosecutor to "determine if the evidence may still be lawfully used." Id.
(emphasis added).
400 As an example, section 3.5(b) could be amended to read: "The prosecutor
should independently assess whether each piece of evidence that has been collected in
her cases was constitutionally obtained and should refrain from using evidence that
she believes was the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation to secure a plea,
conviction, or greater sentence."
401 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 91, § 9-11.231.
402 Id.
403 See MEDWED, supra note 210, at 83 (recognizing that overaggressive focus on
convictions can be combatted by chief prosecutors focusing on broader goals such as
justice and not giving promotions based on conviction statistics); Bibas, supra note
389, at 997-1000 (recognizing importance of prosecutors' office culture and impact of
chief prosecutors in instilling that culture).
'' See Kuckes, supra note 239, at 473, 478-79, 482, 487-88, 493.
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because of the potential electoral repercussions.4"0 Articulating this
duty in the ethical rules is meant to help counterbalance that risk
aversion, albeit imperfectly.
The prosecutor's administrative suppression duty is limited to an
independent, good-faith, subjective assessment of the constitutionality
of searches and seizures and use of evidence that corresponds to that
decision."6 Therefore, while courts or professional disciplinary bodies
should review whether a prosecutor has performed this duty, those
bodies should not be tasked with reviewing the substance of the
prosecutor's conclusions as to constitutionality.4" The duty is
subjective, and rigorous substantive review would merely substitute
strong judicially-reviewed administrative suppression for a weak
judicial exclusionary rule.
CONCLUSION
As this Article has explained, prosecutors have a constitutional duty
to administratively suppress evidence that they conclude was
unconstitutionally obtained. Based on the doctrinal origins of the
judicial exclusionary rule, prosecutors' Fourth Amendment duties
include preventing the government from benefiting from Fourth
Amendment violations. The Court recognized nearly a century ago in
Weeks that the Fourth Amendment prevents the government from
using illegally-obtained evidence. Since then, the Court pared back the
judicial exclusionary remedy for institutional reasons unrelated to the
substantive boundaries of the Fourth Amendment; the Court did not,
however, pare back the scope of the Fourth Amendment norm. In so
doing, the Court left evidentiary exclusion as part of the constitutional
norm, albeit for only the executive branch to enforce. Adhering to that
norm requires administrative suppression.
Administrative suppression would integrate Fourth Amendment
analysis into our administrative system of criminal justice. It would
' See supra notes 387-390 and accompanying text.
406 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 9 (2002) ("A prosecutor's
independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as
to trigger the obligations of sections (g) and (h), though subsequently determined to
have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule." (emphasis added)).
407 See id.; Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, supra note 278, at 1266
("[Bloth the current Standard and the proposed Standard [for the filing of criminal
charges] focus exclusively on the prosecutor's subjective state of mind; neither
Standard requires that the prosecutor's belief be objectively reasonable."); see also, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (prosecutor should not present charges that
she knows are not supported by probable cause); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (1993) (same).
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create an administrative form of the exclusionary rule implemented by
prosecutors with a limited backstop of judicial review. That change
would prevent the Fourth Amendment from being marginalized in a
system where guilty pleas often undercut the ability to seek judicial
relief from an illegal search or seizure.
Moreover, prosecutors' existing ethical responsibilities also provide
reason to recognize a duty of administrative suppression. First,
administrative suppression would help protect constitutional rights by
increasing the cost of a Fourth Amendment violation and facilitating
greater prosecutor involvement in police decisionmaking. Moreover,
administrative suppression would improve crime control efforts
because it would signal to defendants and prosecutors' communities
that the government does not tolerate the police's constitutional
violations. That signal will improve the perceived fairness of criminal
law enforcement, which, under the procedural justice theory, is most
likely to improve crime control efforts by encouraging citizens to
cooperate with the police.
To prevent the perfect from becoming the enemy of the good, this
Article would embrace limited administrative suppression as an
improvement over the status quo even if prosecutors were unwilling
for political or other reasons to embrace the full breadth of
administrative suppression. Such limits could take several forms.
Prosecutors could use administrative suppression to alter a
consistent unlawful police practice. North Carolina's ICE attorneys
have done this to curb racial profiling 4 and Manhattan prosecutors
seem to have administratively suppressed evidence obtained through
stop-and-frisk excesses." Or consider a situation in which police in a
particular jurisdiction repeatedly fail to adjust to a new Supreme
Court decision. In Arizona v. Gantj 0 for example, the Supreme Court
held that searches of an automobile incident to arrest of a recent
occupant were valid only if the arrestee was "unsecured" and "within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search.""' Gant limited an earlier decision, New York v. Belton,412
408 Cade, supra note 1, at 184-85; see also Chin, supra note 331 (arguing that
Attorney General should order federal prosecutors not to prosecute cases in which the
suspect's race tainted officer's stop or investigation).
40 See Prendergast & Schram, supra note 299.
410 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
411 Id. at 343. Gant also allowed for vehicle searches incident to arrest of a recent
occupant based on likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence, id. at 344, but
that basis is not relevant to the current point.
412 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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which had been read to permit all searches incident of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle so long as the arrestee was a recent
occupant. 3 If police did not adjust their behavior to the new Gant
standard but rather repeatedly applied the old Belton standard and
searched the passenger compartments of vehicles even when the
arrestee was secured or outside the reach of the car, administrative
suppression would provide a tool for prosecutors to prompt police to
change their practices.
Or prosecutors could administratively suppress evidence obtained in
clear Fourth Amendment violations but not in close cases, just as the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual provides regarding grand jury proceedings.'
Lastly, even if prosecutors completely refuse administrative
suppression, it is nonetheless important to recognize prosecutors'
intended role as an intrabranch check on police. Prosecutors should
charge and prosecute cases with an eye to the signals they send to
police and the detrimental impact of using illegal evidence on police
behavior and citizens' willingness to cooperate with the police.
413 Gant, 556 U.S. at 342-43.
414 Cf. Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 28, at 65 (finding
that New Orleans prosecutors declined to prosecute a significant number of cases to
encourage more thorough police investigations).
41 See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 91, § 9-11.231.
2014]1 1665
$
